

Deliberation of the French Regulatory Commission of Energy of 19 March 2015 deciding on the evolution of the tariffs for the use of natural gas transmission networks as of 1 April 2015

Present at the session: Philippe de Ladoucette, Chairman, Olivier Challan Belval, Catherine Edwige, H  l  ne Gassin and Jean-Pierre Sotura, Commissioners.

In application of article L.134-2, 4   of the French Energy Code, the CRE has the power to state the methodology for establishing the tariffs for use of the gas transmission networks and tariffs updates.

Articles L.452-2 and L.452-3 of the French Energy Code determine the CRE's competencies over tariffs. Article L.452-2 of said code stipulates that the CRE sets the methods used to establish the tariffs for use of natural gas networks. Furthermore, article L.452-3 states that *"the French Energy Regulation Commission decides on changes to tariffs [...] with, where applicable, the modifications of level and structure that it considers justified, particularly in view of the analysis of operator accounts and the expected development of operating and investment costs. These decisions [...] may provide a multi-year framework for changes to tariffs as well as appropriate short or long term incentive measures to encourage operators to improve their related performance, particularly regarding the quality of the service provided [...]. The Regulatory Commission of Energy [...] carries out, according to methods that it determines, consultation of the stakeholders in the energy market. The Energy Regulation Commission forwards its justified decisions to the ministers responsible for energy and the economy regarding changes in level and structure of tariffs for the use of transmission networks [...] for natural gas [...], as well as the tariff regulations and the dates on which they take effect. Such decisions are published in the official gazette (Journal officiel) of the French Republic [...]."*

The current tariffs for the use of GRTgaz and TIGF (transmission system operators or TSO) natural gas transmission networks, known as "ATRT5 tariffs", took effect on 1 April 2013 for a period of approximately four years. They are subject to an update on 1 April each year from 1st April 2014 according to the processes set forth in the CRE tariff decision dated 13 December 2012¹.

The first update of the ATRT5 tariffs was the subject of a CRE decision dated 29 January 2014².

In addition, two decisions dated 30 October 2014 made changes to the ATRT5 tariffs in order to implement interim measures³ from the point of view of creating a single gas market place (also PEG) by 2018, on the one hand, and defining the incentive-based regulatory mechanism for the Val de Sa  ne and Gascogne/Midi projects⁴ on the other hand.

The purpose of the present decision is to make changes to the ATRT5 tariffs from 1st April 2015.

¹ [Decision of 13 December 2012 forming a ruling on the tariff for the use of natural gas transmission networks](#)

² [Decision of 29 January 2014 forming a ruling on the changes to the tariffs for use of natural gas transmission networks on 1st April 2014](#)

³ [Decision of 30 October 2014 forming a ruling on the changes to the ATRT5 tariff concerning the interim measures prior to the creation of a single PEG by 2018](#)

⁴ [Decision of 30 October 2014 forming a ruling on the incentive-based regulatory mechanism for the Val de Sa  ne and Gascogne/Midi projects](#)

The main changes established in the present decision are as follows:

Changes to the average tariff level

The average increase in the GRTgaz tariff on 1 April 2015 is 2.5%. This change is explained by a 1.2% rise in capacity subscriptions and by a 3.7% increase in authorised revenue, mainly due to the rise in capital expenditure to be covered within the ATRT 5 trajectory.

The average increase in the TIGF tariff on 1st April 2015 is 3.1%. This change is explained by a 1.2% rise in capacity subscriptions and by a 4.3 % increase in authorised revenue, mainly due to the rise in capital expenditure to be covered while the ATRT5 is in existence.

Creation of a common market place to the TIGF and GRTgaz South balancing zones

On 1st April 2015, in accordance with what was decided by the CRE in its tariff decision of 13 December 2012, a common market place to the TIGF and GRTgaz South balancing zones will be created⁵.

This takes the form of the following changes to the tariff structure:

- removal of the tariff charge at the interconnection point of the GRTgaz and TIGF networks (PIR Midi);
- alignment of the tariff charges at the GRTgaz and TIGF transport storage interface points (PITS);
- creation of a common PEG associated with the trading region formed by the GRTgaz and TIGF balancing zones.

Integration of the French market in the European market

As announced in the tariff decision dated 29 January 2014, the France entry tariffs, the costs for transit from the North to Italy and Spain and the tariffs for interfaces with storage are kept stable in constant euros until the end of the ATRT5 tariff period.

Connection of the Dunkirk LNG LNG terminal

The Dunkirk terminal will be connected to the GRTgaz network via the transmission-Dunkirk LNG terminal interface point (PITTM Dunkirk LNG). A tariff for this PITTM is therefore defined in the present decision, equal to that of the other PITTM in the GRTgaz network.

The CRE has also confirmed the tariff of €45/MWh/d/year for the gas transmission service provided by GRTgaz for Fluxys, for the capacities entering Belgium from the Dunkirk terminal.

Creation of the Alveringem network interconnection point

The *open season* held by GRTgaz between 2010 and 2011, in coordination with Fluxys, allowed the launch of the necessary investments to create a new interconnection with Belgium from late 2015.

As the CRE announced for information purposes during the *open season*, the tariff for firm capacities from the North region to Belgium via the Alveringem interconnection point is fixed at €45/MWh/d/year.

Incentive-based regulation of the quality of service of gas carriers

In addition to changing the way in which certain indicators are calculated, the CRE has created a new indicator relating to the annual availability of all firm and interruptible capacities at the North-South link, which will not be subject to a financial incentive for the first year.

This decision was submitted to the French Higher Energy Council for its opinion on 18 March 2015.

⁵ The operating methods of this common PEG were defined by the CRE in the decision of 22 May 2014 forming a ruling on the rules for the operation of the marketplace common to the GRTgaz South and TIGF zones on 1st April 2015

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METHODOLOGY

I. Regulatory framework: reminder of the provisions of the ATRT5 tariffs

The tariffs for use of GRTgaz and TIGF natural gas transmission networks, known as "ATRT5 tariffs", took effect on 1st April 2013 for a period of approximately four years.

The ATRT5 tariff is made up of incentive regulatory mechanisms covering three different areas:

- an incentive regulation of investments: this consists, on the one hand, of incentives for making the investments necessary for improving the operation of the French market and its integration into the European market and, on the other hand, of incentives for controlling the costs of investment projects;
- an incentive regulation of operating charges: the net operating charges of the transmission system operators (TSO) change every year, from the level used for 2013, depending on inflation and an annual development coefficient. This coefficient includes a productivity target related to a constant scope of activity with respect to the ATRT4 period. The additional productivity gains that could be achieved beyond this target are retained by each TSO. Likewise, any extra costs that may be incurred are borne by the TSO;
- incentive regulation of the quality of service which is for the purpose of improving the quality of service provided to transmission system users in the fields considered important for the correct operation of the market.

The ATRT5 includes the expense and revenue regulatory account (CRCP) which makes it possible to cover all or part of the deviations in costs or revenue encountered in certain predefined items. Clearing of the balance of this account takes place by reduction or increase of the revenue to be recovered by the tariffs. To ensure the financial neutrality of the CRCP, amounts included in the equalisation account are discounted at an interest rate equivalent to the risk-free rate fixed at 4.0% per year, nominal before tax.

The tariff decision dated 13 December 2012 stated that the tariff table of both operators is to change on 1 April each year from 1 April 2014 according to the following principles:

- taking account of the development of the authorised revenue defined for four years and made up of:
 - the development of capital expenditure defined by the CRE;
 - the development of the operating expenditure fixed by the CRE and that changes each year based on inflation and a predefined coefficient;
 - update of the "energy and CO₂ quotas" item;
- update of the capacity subscription hypotheses;
- clearing of one quarter of the overall balance of the claw-back mechanism;
- changes to the tariff structure decided by the CRE, particularly to reduce the number of marketplaces and to implement the European network codes.

II. GRTgaz authorised revenue

A. Operating expenses (OPEX)

1. Net operating expenses excluding review of energy costs

The net operating expenses to be covered by the GRTgaz transmission tariff, excluding variation in energy costs came to €m 766.7 for 2013 (ATRT5 tariff) and €m 761.7 for 2014 (change to ATRT5 tariff on 1st April 2014). The level of OPEX used for 2014 is €m 761.2 after taking account of the real value of inflation for 2013.

The ATRT5 tariff of GRTgaz states that, excluding any variation in the price of energy, the net OPEX for 2015 are calculated by applying to the OPEX for 2014 "a percentage variation equal to the CPI – 1.45%, where the CPI corresponds to the average annual variation actually recorded in the previous calendar year in the consumer price index, excluding tobacco, as calculated by the French National Institute of Statistics (INSEE) for all households in France".

The inflation hypothesis for 2014 on which the Finance Bill for 2015 is based is + 0.5%⁶ and therefore the net operating expenses used for 2015, excluding variation in the price of energy, will fall by 0.95% compared to those used for 2014, i.e. the sum of €m 754. The difference between the forecast inflation for 2014 taken into account by the CRE and the inflation actually recorded will be covered by the claw back mechanism.

2. Review of energy costs

In application of the ATRT5 tariff rules, the CRE has modified the amount forecast for GRTgaz energy costs in 2015.

GRTgaz energy requirements for 2015 are globally stable compared to 2014. Fuel energy requirements remain at a high level due to the high North-South flow forecasts related to the LNG market situation.

The GRTgaz energy costs forecast for 2015 are lower than those initially included in the ATRT5 tariff. This is mainly due to the fall in gas prices and the optimisation carried out by GRTgaz regarding gas flow in its network and the deviation in the technical review.

	2013 – Completed		2014 - estimated in November 2014		2015 (forecast ATRT5 tariff)		2015 updated	
	Volume GWh	Amount €m	Volume GWh	Amount €m	Volume GWh	Amount €m	Volume GWh	Amount €m
Fuel gas	1,924	43.2	2,066	51.6	2,192	60.3	2,066	52
Technical balance review	970	25	944	23.6	1,325	33.6	878	22.1
Electricity	427	29.6	482	32.2	293	27.5	482	35.4
TICGN (tax on natural gas)	-	-	1,532	2	-	-	2,000	5.4
CO₂ Quotas	-	-	-	-	116 kt	1.4	-	-
Total	-	97.8	-	109.4	-	122.8	-	114.9

Update of the "energy and CO₂ quotas" item for GRTgaz has led to a €m 7.9 reduction in the forecast related to this item for 2015.

3. Net operating expenses

After update of the "energy and CO₂ quotas" item for 2015, the net operating expenses to be taken into account in the GRTgaz authorised revenue for 2015 come to €m 746.1. These expenses are €m 5.7 higher than those required for 2014, i.e. 0.8%.

⁶ See the explanation of reasons on the filing on 1st October 2014 of the Finance Bill for 2015, n° 2234

B. Standard capital expenditure

The tariff decision of 13 December 2012 sets the forecast capital expenditure to be used each year for updating the GRTgaz tariff. In application of this decision, the forecast capital expenditure required for GRTgaz for 2015 is €m 1,044.8. These expenses are €m 71 higher than those required for 2014, i.e. +7.3 %.

C. CRCP reconciliation

At the end of 2013, the updated amount of the claw back mechanism was €m 16.2 to be returned to consumers. Clearing one quarter of this amount in 2014 led to €m 4.5 being taken back from GRTgaz. The updated stock⁷ pending clearance is €m 12.4 (at 2014 value).

The definitive balance of the claw back mechanism for 2013 was €m 9.1 higher than the estimate made in the ATRT5 update in November 2013, mainly due to the fact that the 2013 definitive capital expenditure was €m 8.5 higher than the estimated expenditure. The difference has been returned to GRTgaz.

The amount of the claw back account for 2014 was estimated at €m -62.7 at the end of November.

€m	2014 tariff	Estimated Nov. 2014	Difference	Paid to equalisation account
Revenue routed downstream, 100% covered	1203.0	1223.9	20.9	-20.9
Revenue routed upstream, 50% covered	494.4	509.3	14.9	-7.5
Standard capital expenditure	973.8	934.0	-39.8	-39.8
Energy item	104.1	109.4	5.3	4.2
Connection costs	3.3	2.3	-1.0	1.0
Service agreement between GRTgaz and TIGF	33.6	33.2	-0.4	-0.4
Incentive-based regulation of quality of service	0.0	1.1	1.1	1.1
OPEX deviation due to CPI	761.7	761.2	-0.5	-0.5
TOTAL CRCP				-62.7

By adding the updated amount of the equalisation account pending adjustment from previous years (€m -12.4), the updated deviation in the 2013 equalisation account (€m +9.5) and the 2014 provisional equalisation account (€m -62.7), we obtain a total updated sum of €m -65.6 to be returned to consumers.

In accordance with the tariff regulations in force, clearing this amount leads to taking back €m 18.1 from GRTgaz each year over four years from 2015.

⁷ Update to the equivalent of the risk-free rate, i.e. 4.0 % per year nominal before tax

€m	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Equalisation account amount	-16.2	- 65.6			
Clearing of one quarter of the overall amount	-4.5	-18.1	-18.1	-18.1	-18.1

D. Authorised income

The total level of costs to be covered by the GRTgaz tariff in 2015 is €m 1772.8, a rise of 3.7% compared to 2014:

€m	2013	2014	2015
Standard capital expenditure	893.6	973.8	1044.8
Net operating expenses	766.7	761.7	754.0
Revised energy costs	-	-21.3	-7.9
Clearing the equalisation account	2.2	-4.5	-18.1
Total authorised revenue	1,662.4	1,709.8	1,772.8

III. TIGF authorised revenue

A. Operating expenses (OPEX)

1. Net operating expenses excluding review of energy costs

The net operating expenses, excluding variation in energy, costs came to €m 64.2 for 2013 (ATRT5 tariff) and €m 66.3 for 2014 (change to ATRT5 tariff on 1st April 2014). The level of OPEX used for 2014 is €m 66.2 after taking account of the real value of inflation for 2013.

The TIGF ATRT5 tariff states that, excluding any variation in the price of energy, the net OPEX for 2015 are calculated by applying to the OPEX for 2014 "a percentage variation equal to the CPI – 2.45%, where the CPI corresponds to the average annual variation actually recorded in the previous calendar year in the consumer price index, excluding tobacco, as calculated by the French National Institute of Statistics (INSEE) for all households in France".

The inflation hypothesis for 2014 on which the Finance Bill for 2015 is based is +0.5%⁸ and therefore the net operating expenses used for 2015, excluding variation in the price of energy, will fall by 2.95 % compared to those used for 2014, i.e. the sum of €m 68.2. The difference between the forecast inflation for 2014 taken into account by the CRE and the inflation actually recorded will be covered by the equalisation account.

2. Review of energy costs

In application of the ATRT5 tariff rules, the CRE has modified the amount forecast for TIGF energy costs in 2015.

In 2014, the flow to Spain remained at a very high level and no physical flow from Spain to France was recorded. The forecast for 2015 is close to the values recorded in 2014.

⁸ See the explanation of reasons on the filing on 1st October 2014 of the Finance Bill for 2015, n° 2234

	2013 – Completed		2014 - estimated in November 2014		2015 (forecast ATRT5 tariff)		2015 updated	
	Volume GWh	Amount €m	Volume GWh	Amount €m	Volume GWh	Amount €m	Volume GWh	Amount €m
Fuel gas	309	8.7	252	6.7	167	4.7	261	7
technical balance difference	139	3.9	122	3.2	-	-	110	3
Electricity	15	1.3	15	1.4	10	0.9	15	1.4
Total	-	13.9	-	11.3	-	5.6	-	11.4

Update of the "energy and CO2 quotas" item for TIGF has led to a €m 5.8 reduction in the forecast related to this item for 2015.

3. *Net operating expenses*

After update of the energy item for 2015, the net operating expenses to be taken into account in the authorised revenue for 2015 come to €m 74. These expenses are €m 3.1 higher than those required for 2014, i.e. +4.4%.

B. **Standard capital expenditure**

The tariff decision of 13 December 2012 sets the forecast capital expenditure to be used each year for updating the TIGF tariff. In application of this decision, the forecast capital expenditure required for TIGF for 2015 is €m 164.5. These expenses are €m 7.2 higher than those required for 2014, i.e. 4.6 %.

C. **CRCP reconciliation**

At the end of 2013, the updated CRCP was €m 2.5 to be returned to consumers. Clearing one quarter of this amount in 2014 led to €m 0.7 being taken back from TIGF. The updated stock⁹ pending clearance is €m 1.9 (at 2014 value).

The definitive amount of the equalisation account for 2013 was €m 2.7 higher than the estimate made in the ATRT5 update in November 2013, mainly due to the fact that the definitive energy costs were higher than estimated (€m +1.8) and actual subscriptions were lower than the regional network forecasts (-€m 0.6). The difference has been returned to TIGF.

The amount of the equalisation account for 2014 was estimated at €m -5.6 at the end of November.

⁹ Update to the equivalent of the risk-free rate, i.e. 4.0% per year nominal before tax

€m	2014 tariff	Estimated Nov. 2014	Difference	Paid to equalisation account
Revenue routed downstream, 100% covered	120.3	122.3	2.0	-2.0
Revenue routed upstream, 50% covered	103.3	100.0	-3.3	1.7
Standard capital expenditure	157.3	150.4	-6.9	-6.9
Energy item	10	11.4	1.4	1.1
Service agreement between GRTgaz and TIGF	33.8	33.2	-0.6	0.6
Incentive-based regulation of quality of service	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1
OPEX deviation due to CPI	66.3	66.2	0.0	0.0
TOTAL CRCP				-5.6

By adding the updated balance of the equalisation account pending adjustment from previous years (€m - 1.9), the updated deviation in the 2013 equalisation account (€m +2.8) and the 2014 provisional equalisation account (€m -5.6), we obtain a total updated sum of €m -4.7 to be returned to consumers.

In accordance with the tariff regulations in force, clearing this amount leads to taking back €m 1.3 from TIGF each year over four years from 2015.

€m	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Equalisation account amount	-2.5	-4.7			
Clearing of one quarter of the overall amount	-0.7	-1.3	-1.3	-1.3	-1.3

D. Authorised income

The total level of costs to be covered by the TIGF tariff in 2015 is €m 237.2, a rise of 4.3 % compared to 2014:

€m	2013	2014	2015
Standard capital expenditure	143.8	157.3	164.5
Net operating expenses	64.2	66.3	68.2
Review of energy costs	-	4.7	5.8
Clearing the equalisation account	-3.2	-0.7	-1.3
Total authorised revenue	204.9	227.5	237.2

IV. Transmission capacity subscription hypotheses

A. GRTgaz

1. *Global changes to the capacity subscription hypotheses*

Subscription forecasts for 2015 are up by 1.2% compared to the forecasts used for 2014 at the time of the tariff change on 1 April 2014.

Estimated capacity subscriptions for 2015 are up by 1.7 % compared to the forecasts used for 2014 at the time of the tariff change on 1 April 2014. This increase can mainly be explained by higher sales than expected for the transmission-storage service (JTS) and market coupling, as well as high subscriptions to the Transmission Storage Interface Point (PITS).

The forecast subscriptions used by the CRE for 2015 are 0.5% down on the subscriptions estimated for 2014.

2. *Main network*

In the main network, the new capacity subscription hypotheses for 2015 are up by 6% on average compared to the forecasts used at the time of the tariff change on 1 April 2014 (0.9% lower compared to the 2014 estimate).

3. *Regional network*

Leaving the main network and entering the regional network and routing and delivery to the regional network, the new capacity subscription hypotheses are 1% lower than those used at the time of the tariff change on 1 April 2014 (and 0.6% lower compared to the 2014 estimate). This reduction is mainly due to a reduction in capacity subscriptions from industrial clients.

The subscription hypotheses used by the CRE for 2015 do not take account of moth-balling of power plants in 2015.

B. TIGF

1. *Global evolution of the capacity subscription hypotheses*

Subscription forecasts for 2015 are up by 1.2% compared to the forecasts used at the time of the tariff change on 1st April 2014.

Estimated capacity subscriptions for 2015 are up by 0.4 % compared to the forecasts used at the time of the tariff change on 1st April 2014. This increase is mainly explained by differences in respect of higher than expected PITS subscriptions (+25%). Forecast subscriptions for 2015 are up by 0.8% compared to the 2014 estimate.

2. *Main network*

In the main network, the new capacity subscription hypotheses for 2015 are up by 1.7% on average compared to the forecasts used at the time of the tariff change on 1 April 2014 (and 1% higher compared to the 2014 estimate). The CRE has used slightly lower subscriptions to the PITS compared to the first quarter 2015 and has taken the subscription level recorded in 2014 in the PIR Pirineos.

3. Regional network

In the regional network, the new capacity subscription hypotheses for 2015 are stable compared to the forecasts used at the time of the tariff change on 1st April 2014 (and 0.2 % higher compared to the 2014 estimate).

V. Average changes to GRTgaz and TIGF tariffs

For GRTgaz, the forecasts used for 2015 lead to a 3.7% increase in the authorised revenue and a 1.2% increase in capacity subscriptions compared to the levels used at the time of the first tariff update. The result is an average increase of 2.5% in the GRT6gaz tariff on 1st April 2015.

For TIGF, the forecasts used for 2015 lead to a 4.3% increase in the authorised revenue and 1.2% in capacity subscriptions compared to the levels used at the time of the first tariff update. The result is an average increase of 3.1% in the TIGF tariff on 1st April 2015.

VI. Tariff structure

The methodology for preparing the ATRT5 tariffs used by the CRE in its decision of 13 December 2012 states that it may decide to make changes to the structure of these tariffs, in particular in order to "*reduce the number of marketplaces and implement the European network codes*".

In its decisions of 19 July 2012¹⁰, 13 December 2012¹¹ and 7 May 2014¹², the CRE defined a roadmap for creating a single marketplace in France by 2018. In this respect, it has decided to create a common marketplace to the GRTgaz South and TIGF zones by 1 April 2015.

The present tariff decision includes the changes to the structure necessary for taking these changes into account, as well as the modifications intended to improve the integration of the French market in the European gas market and various technical developments.

The CRE conducted a public consultation regarding the planned changes to the structure from 30 October to 20 November 2014¹³. The non-confidential answers are available on the CRE website.

A. Reduction in the number of marketplaces

1. Creation of a GRTgaz South-TIGF common marketplace

On 1 April 2015, a common marketplace to the GRTgaz South and TIGF balancing zones will be created, which will involve:

- the disappearance of the interface capacity charge between the GRTgaz South and TIGF zones;
- alignment of the tariffs for the PITS in GRTgaz South and TIGF zones;
- creation of a common PEG to the GRTgaz South and TIGF balancing zones and the disappearance of the PEG South and PEG TIGF.

¹⁰ [CRE decision dated 19 July 2012 forming guidelines on the changes to gas marketplaces in France](#)

¹¹ [CRE decision dated 13 December 2012 forming a ruling on the tariff for use of natural gas transmission networks](#)

¹² [CRE decision dated 7 May 2014 forming guidelines concerning the creation of a single marketplace in France in 2018](#)

¹³ [CRE public consultation regarding the update of tariffs for use of the GRTgaz and TIGF gas transmission networks on 1st April 2015](#)

a) Connection between the GRTgaz South and TIGF zones

In order to prepare for the creation of the common PEG, the ATRT5 tariff provides for a gradual reduction of the tariff charge at the interface between the TIGF and GRTgaz South zones to reach 0 on 1 April 2015. This charge was already reduced from €140/MWh/d per year to €100/MWh/d per year on 1 April 2013 and then to €50/MWh/day per year on 1 April 2014.

On 1 April 2015, the tariff charge at the interface between the TIGF and GRTgaz South zones will be removed. Shippers will have access to a market zone made up of GRTgaz South and TIGF balancing zones, without having the need to subscribe to capacities for transport gas between the two zones.

b) Tariff system for the PITS

The CRE asked the Pöyry firm to conduct a study of the tariff system for the capacities in the PITS, which was completed in October 2013 and the final report is available on the CRE website¹⁴.

Based on the conclusions of this study, in its decision of 29 January 2014 on the update of ATRT5 tariffs, the CRE used a multiplying coefficient of 1.33 between the TIGF PITS tariffs and those of GRTgaz South on 1st April 2015.

The Pöyry study also showed that the PITS tariffs in the networks of other operators in Europe are higher on leaving the network for storage than on entering the network from storage. This tariff structure corresponds to that of the TIGF tariff but not that of the GRTgaz tariff.

In the decision of 29 January 2014, the CRE decided that the GRTgaz PITS tariffs would change on 1st April 2015 to a tariff structure compliant with that of the other European operators.

The CRE proposed, in its public consultation, making this changeover to a constant revenue, in constant euros, at the PITS for GRTgaz. The great majority of stakeholders are in favour of the method proposed by the CRE to fix the GRTgaz and TIGF PITS tariffs.

The CRE has chosen to switch the tariff structure at the PITS for GRTgaz to a constant revenue in constant euros. Such a change is neutral in terms of overall cost of access to storage located in the GRTgaz zones for all shippers and therefore it will not lead to any financial transfer between storage users and the other gas transmission system users.

A coefficient of 1.33 will be applied to the tariff for the GRTgaz PITS capacities to fix the tariff for the capacities TIGF PITS capacities in accordance with the decision of 29 December 2014. In application of the rules defined in this way, the PITS tariff table is fixed as follows:

PITS zone	TCES ¹⁵ (€/MWh/day per year)	TCSS ¹⁶ (€/MWh/day per year)
GRTgaz North	8.17	18.39
GRTgaz South	9.00	20.24
TIGF	11.96	26.92

2. **Creation of a single PEG for France**

In its decision of 7 May 2014, the CRE confirmed the creation of a single PEG based on the investment plan combining the Val de Saône and Gascogne-Midi projects in 2018, subject to completion of the work by this date.

¹⁴ [Study concerning the tariff charges for access to the PITS](#)

¹⁵ Capacity charge for entry to the main network from storage

¹⁶ Capacity charge for exit from the main network to storage

In the changes to tariffs on 1 April 2013 and 1 April 2014, the CRE had decided to maintain in current euros the annual tariff charges at the North-South link from the point of view of creating a single marketplace in France in 2018, which will lead to the disappearance of this tariff charge.

For the tariff update on 1 April 2015, the CRE will maintain the annual tariff charges at the North-South link unchanged in current euros.

B. Implementation of the network codes and integration of the European gas markets

1. Maintenance in constant euros of the tariff charges at the entry and exit of the TSOs networks

In its decision of 29 January 2014, the CRE used the principle of maintenance in constant euros of the tariff charges at the network interconnection points (PIR), the LNG terminal transport interface points (PITTM) and the PITS (independently of the convergence of the PITS tariffs in the GRTgaz South and TIGF zones) during the ATRT5 tariff period.

The same applies to the cost of transits to Spain and Italy. In the case of transit to Spain, the disappearance of the PIR Midi tariff should be offset by an equal increase in the tariff on exit from the TIGF network to the PIR Pirineos, in order to reflect the costs of transporting the gas from Northern France to Spain.

Finally, the tariff on entry to the TIGF network at the PIR Pirineos is aligned, until the end of the ATRT5 tariff, with that of terrestrial entries to the GRTgaz network.

2. Tariff system for intra-day products

The European regulations on the establishment of a network code on the capacity allocation mechanisms¹⁷ ("CAM code"), which will apply from 1st November 2015, plans, at the interconnection points affected by the code, to market during the gas day, at auctions organised every hour, the firm capacities that were left unsold at the end of the previous auctions. At these intra-day auctions, the capacities are offered for the number of hours remaining in the gas day.

The CRE proposed, in its public consultation, setting the tariff for these intra-day capacities at the level of the daily capacities tariff in proportion to the number of hours remaining in the gas day, which is one of the options provided by the framework guidelines on tariffs for use of transmission networks¹⁸.

The majority of contributors are in favour of the CRE proposal. Some shippers nonetheless consider that this provision of the CAM code adds complexity to the process for marketing of capacities and wish to defer implementation. Furthermore, some contributors consider that the intra-day capacity tariff should be higher than the daily capacity tariff in order to encourage shippers to renominate sooner.

The CRE uses the mechanism presented in its public consultation concerning the intra-day capacity tariff.

It considers that the marketing of intra-day capacities should be coordinated between the French operators and their neighbours. In this respect, it has asked GRTgaz and TIGF to approach the German, Belgian and Spanish operators with a view to coordinated implementation of the provisions of the CAM code concerning the marketing of intra-day capacities. GRTgaz and TIGF will present an update on the progress of this work to the CRE by July 2015.

It has asked to present regular reports on the renominations of stakeholders in Concertation Gaz.

¹⁷ [Regulation \(EU\) n°984/2013 of the Commission of 14 October 2013 related to the establishment of a network code on the capacity allocation mechanisms in gas transmission networks and complementing regulation \(EC\) n°715/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council](#)

¹⁸ [Framework guidelines on rules regarding harmonised transmission tariff structures for gas, 29 November 2013, FG-2013-G-01](#)

C. Commissioning of the Dunkirk LNG terminal

1. Entry capacity tariff at the Dunkirk LNG PITTM

Commissioning of the Dunkirk terminal is scheduled for late 2015. The gas sent out from the terminal to the Pitgam station could be odorised and emitted to the GRTgaz network in the North or be directly routed without odorisation to Belgium.

It is therefore necessary to create a new "Dunkirk LNG" PITTM, for which the tariff is defined in the present decision.

The CRE set out in its decision of 12 July 2011¹⁹ the financial conditions for connection of the Dunkirk terminal to the GRTgaz network. An economic test has been established to validate the tariff level to be applied at the Dunkirk LNG PITTM according to the investment involved in the connection. This economic test takes account of the costs for connecting the terminal to the GRTgaz main network, i.e. the Pitgam compression and interconnection station, as well as the level of capacities subscription at the Dunkirk PITTM.

The application of this economic test at the end of 2014 has led the CRE to propose maintaining the principle of tariff equalisation of the Dunkirk PITTM with the other PITTMs. The majority of the contributions received at the public consultation carried out by the CRE were in favour of this proposal.

From 1 April 2015, the CRE therefore fixes the tariff at the Dunkirk LNG PITTM at the same level as the Fos and Montoir PITTMs.

2. Changes to the rules on subscription to capacity at the Fos, Montoir and Dunkirk LNG PITTM

The tariffs for access to LNG terminals known as ATTM4²⁰ define "flat" or "spot" services that allow LNG to be regasified and gas to be sent out on the transmission network for 30 consecutive days at a constant level.

The ATRT5 tariff of GRTgaz states that any shipper subscribing to a "flat" or "spot" service with LNG terminal operators is allocated a basic firm monthly capacity (C) by GRTgaz equal to 1/30th of the regasification capacity subscribed to with the LNG terminal operators. The applicable price is equal to 1/12th of the firm annual subscription price.

The Dunkirk LNG terminal has obtained a full exemption from third-party regulated access and tariff regulation for 20 years after commissioning²¹. It is therefore free to define its commercial offer subject to applying it in a non-discriminatory way to all its users and disclosing it to the CRE.

In its public consultation, the CRE proposed changes to the rules on subscription to capacities at the PITTM, by introducing a more flexible mechanism, which is better suited to the Dunkirk LNG commercial offer. This change, which would not involve any cost for GRTgaz, would also apply to the other PITTMs, thus allowing the regulated LNG terminals to propose more flexible offers.

The majority of contributors to the public consultation were in favour of the CRE proposal, which they believed responded to the requirements regarding flexibility in French terminals.

The CRE decided that from 1 April 2015, any shipper would be able to reserve constant entry capacity to the PITTM for a multiple of 10 consecutive days with a tariff equal, per 10-day block, to 10/365th of the firm annual subscription price.

¹⁹ [Decision of the Energy Regulation Commission of 12 July 2011 forming a ruling on the conditions for connecting the Dunkirk LNG terminal to the GRTgaz network and on the development of a new interconnection with Belgium in Veurne](#)

²⁰ [Decision of the Energy Regulation Commission of 13 December 2012 forming a ruling on the tariff for the use of regulated LNG terminals](#)

²¹ [Decree of 18 February 2010 authorising the Dunkirk LNG company to benefit from an exemption from third-party regulated access for its LNG terminal project in Dunkirk \(NOR: DEVE1005264A\)](#)

Any excess will be invoiced in accordance with the regulations in force at 1/240th of the firm annual subscription price.

For the next tariff update, the CRE has asked GRTgaz to work on the implementation of a more flexible reservation, based on N consecutive days, with a minimum of 10 days. The subscription level would be constant for the entire duration of the product. This service would be invoiced at N/365th of the firm annual subscription price.

D. Creation of the Alveringem PIR

1. Capacity to Belgium from the Dunkirk LNG terminal and from the North zone

The *open season* held by GRTgaz between 2010 and 2011, in coordination with Fluxys, allowed the launch of the investments necessary to create a new interconnection with Belgium from late 2015. This new interconnection will make it possible to offer approximately 270 GWh/day of firm exit capacity from France to Belgium, and the gas exported will not be odorised.

Capacity from the Dunkirk LNG terminal to Belgium

Capacity entering Belgium from the Dunkirk LNG terminal will be marketed by Fluxys, and transmission on the GRTgaz network is the subject of a service provision from GRTgaz to Fluxys.

In its decision of 12 July 2011, the CRE indicated, in respect of the forecast costs for development of these capacities, that the tariff invoiced by GRTgaz to Fluxys for transport from the terminal to Belgium would be €45/MWh/d/year. The CRE expects it to be possible to re-assess this amount according to the real level of investment.

At this stage, the evaluation of costs on completion of projects does not justify any modification of the forecast level of €45/MWh/d/year.

Consequently, the CRE has confirmed the tariff of € 45/MWh/d/year for the gas transmission service provided by GRTgaz for Fluxys, for the capacities entering Belgium from the Dunkirk terminal.

Capacity from the North zone to Belgium

The tariff for the interruptible backhaul capacity to Belgium at the Taisnières H point is equal to 1/5th of the tariff in the Belgium to France direction, i.e. approximately €22.8/MWh/d/year on 1 April 2015, in accordance with the update of the tariff on 1 April 2014, which provided an inflation-linked change to tariffs on entry into France.

The firm capacity tariff is equal to double that of the interruptible capacity at the PIR. In its public consultation, the CRE therefore proposed a tariff bordering €45/MWh/d/year for the firm capacity from France to Belgium. The majority of the contributions received at the public consultation carried out by the CRE were in favour of this proposal.

The CRE will apply a tariff of €45/MWh/d/year to the firm capacity from the North zone to Belgium at the Alveringem interconnection point.

2. Capacity from Belgium to France

The CAM network code states that operators should market interruptible backhaul products at the daily minimum at the unidirectional points. Pending the creation of the France – Belgium virtual interconnection point, the CRE has proposed introducing daily interruptible backhaul capacity at the Alveringem point in the Belgium to France direction.

The CRE has therefore proposed marketing 4 GWh/d of daily interruptible backhaul capacity at a tariff equal to the price of the interruptible capacity from Belgium to France at Taisnières H. As the marketing is to take place on a daily basis, the reserve price of this capacity would be equal to the tariff stated, multiplied by the daily coefficient of 1/240th in force at all uncongested interconnection points.

The majority of contributors are in favour of the CRE proposals.

The CRE has decided to market 4 GWh/d of daily backhaul capacity at the price of the interruptible capacity from Belgium to France at Taisnières H at €57.09/MWh/d/year.

3. Creation of a France-Belgium virtual PIR

The GRTgaz tariff now has tariffs for two H-gas interconnection points with Belgium: Taisnières H and Alveringem.

However, the European CAM network code provides for the implementation of virtual interconnection points between neighbouring countries. The preparation work for creating a virtual interconnection point between France and Belgium to connect the Taisnières H and Alveringem points has not been completed. This virtual point therefore is unlikely to be operational when the code comes into effect on 1 November 2015.

The CRE has asked GRTgaz to approach Fluxys to prepare for the creation of a H-gas virtual PIR between France and Belgium on the next change to the ATRT5 tariff. GRTgaz will report on this work to the CRE by 1 July 2015.

E. Other structural elements

1. Redistribution of surplus auction revenue

In its decision of 18 June 2014, the CRE stated that after the public consultation it would like to address the following elements:

- rules on the redistribution of surplus auction revenue for the monthly and daily capacity from 1 October 2014;
- rules concerning the differences to be found between the total amounts redistributed and the surplus auction revenue collected from 1 October 2014;
- rules on the redistribution of surplus auction revenue for the annual and quarterly capacity from 1 October 2015.

In its decision dated 18 June 2014²², the CRE defined the methods for redistributing the annual and quarterly surplus auction revenue at the North-South link and the France / Spain interconnection between 1 October 2014 and 30 September 2015.

- a. Rules concerning the redistribution of surplus auction revenue for monthly and daily capacity and deviations

At its public consultation, the CRE proposed two possible methods:

- adding the surplus auction revenue from monthly and daily capacity and the deviations found between redistribution and the amount collected by the operators to the amounts to be repaid in the following year;
- adjust the monthly and daily auction revenue and the redistribution deviations, applying them to the volumes eligible for redistribution based on consumption during the current year.

The majority of contributors are in favour of the first redistribution method. They consider that it offers more transparency and visibility. A minority of shippers would nonetheless like to see the implementation of the second method, which allows redistribution and settlement of any deviations to be redistributed to take place as soon as possible and therefore avoids a time gap of one year between consumption and redistribution.

The CRE uses the first method, which makes it possible to publish the definitive unit amounts for redistribution for the gas year from the month of July. This more transparent method encourages the development of competition on gas prices to the benefit of consumers.

²² [CRE decision dated 18 June 2014 forming a ruling on the rules for redistribution of surplus auction revenue from gas transmission capacity and their application for the period from 1st October 2014 to 30 September 2015](#)

b. Redistribution of surplus auction revenue from annual and quarterly capacity from 1 October 2015

At its public consultation, the CRE proposed continuing with the redistribution methods defined in its decision of 18 June 2014.

The contributors, with the exception of the industrial consumers who would like to see more favourable redistribution for gas-intensive users, support the CRE proposal. However, some shippers have reiterated their position, according to which redistribution in proportion to the subscribed capacity would be preferable to redistribution in proportion to the volumes consumed.

The CRE has chosen the proposal made at the public consultation.

c. Redistribution of surplus auction revenue from quarterly backhaul capacity at the PIR Jura

At its public consultation, the CRE proposed applying, from October 2015, the redistribution methods defined in its decision of 18 June 2014 for the North-South capacity. The surplus at the PIR Jura will be redistributed once a quarter to the shippers delivering to end customers in GRTgaz South and TIGF zone, in proportion to the volumes consumed in these zones. The majority of contributors to the public consultation were in favour of the CRE proposal.

The CRE has chosen the proposal made at the public consultation.

2. Specific requests concerning gas-intensive consumers

In its reply to the public consultation of 18 July 2014 concerning the implementation of interim measures prior to the creation of a unique GEP, the UNIDEN asked for the implementation of measures in favour of gas-intensive consumers (tariff reductions, priority allocation).

The CRE asked for opinions on these changes. With the exception of the gas-intensive consumers, contributors were not in favour of the UNIDEN requests.

Consequently, the CRE has not taken up the measures proposed by the UNIDEN in favour of gas-intensive consumers.

3. Interim offer of short notice interruptible routing in the GRTgaz South zone

Some shippers in the South zone asked for an offer of short notice interruptible routing to be set up in the South zone.

At its public consultation, the CRE proposed an interim offer that would be applicable in the South zone prior to the creation of a single marketplace in France. It could be subscribed to by sites located in the South zone reserving daily capacity of more than 10 GWh/d. The sites involved could be interrupted in the event of complete interruption of the North-South interruptible capacity.

Opinion amongst contributors was divided, with a slight majority in favour of the implementation of such an offer. Several stakeholders noted that this measure offers GRTgaz an additional tool for coping with tensions at the North-South link. However, some shippers believe that this measure will increase the cost of routing for those who will not benefit from it. Two stakeholders stated that there is already a short notice interruptible offer but that its purpose is to minimise the cost of investment in the transmission networks. However, the sites affected by this new offer are already connected to the transmission system.

The CRE believes that this offer would potentially present advantages for the correct operation of the gas market:

- making large delivery capacities in the South zone interruptible;
- avoiding the termination of large capacity subscriptions that make a significant contribution to the balancing of the GRTgaz tariff.

The CRE has decided to implement this offer for highly modulated sites in the South zone reserving daily capacity of more than 10 GWh/d due to their contribution to the balancing of the French energy system.

F. Summary of the changes to the GRTgaz and TIGF tariff table

The structural changes described above generate loss of revenue and loss of profit that have to be offset against the other tariff charges:

- loss of revenue related to the removal of tariffs for the GRTgaz South –TIGF connection;
- loss of revenue related to the reduction in tariffs at the PITS in the TIGF zone;
- maintenance in current euros of the tariffs for the North-South connection;
- maintenance in constant euros of the entry and exit tariffs (PIR, PITTM and PITS);
- maintenance of transit in constant euros.

The average increase of 2.5% in the GRTgaz tariff has led, after taking account of these structural effects, to a 5% increase in the other tariff charges. This increase has been uniformly applied to the concerned tariff charges.

GRTgaz	Tariff variation on 1 st April 2015
Tariff reduction	GRTgaz South-TIGF connection (-100%)
Maintenance in current euros:	North-South link
Maintenance in constant euros:	France entry: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PIR (Dunkirk, Taisnières, Obergailbach) • PITTM PITS (switching of charges) PIR Oltingue exit
Increase in other tariff charges:	PIR Jura (+5%) Exit to regional network (+5%) Transmission on regional network (+5%) Delivery to regional network (+5%)

(Values rounded off to the nearest percentage point)

For TIGF, from the point of view of creating a single marketplace in the South of France on 1 April 2015, the average increase of 3.1% is applied, after taking account of the structural effects, in order to bring the tariff charges of the TIGF regional network in line with those of the GRTgaz regional network:

- the capacity charge on exit from the main network to the regional network in the TIGF zone is equal to that of GRTgaz (+5%);
- the capacity charges for delivery in the TIGF zone have undergone a higher increase (+25%) than the tariff for routing on the regional network (+14.4%), in order to bring them in line with those of the GRTgaz tariff.

TIGF	Tariff variation on 1 st April 2015
Tariff reduction	GRTgaz South-TIGF connection (-100%) PITS (-19.4%)
Maintenance in constant euros:	Maintenance of the transmission cost from the North of France to Spain involves an increase on exit to Spain (+12.1%) PIR Spain entry (aligned with entry to the GRTgaz zone PIR)
Increase in other tariff charges:	Exit to regional network (+5%) Transmission on regional network (+14.4 %) Delivery to PIRD regional network (+25%) Delivery to PIC regional network (+25%)

(Values rounded off to the nearest percentage point)

G. Update of the incentive regulation of operator quality of service

The mechanism for incentive regulation of quality of service implemented in the ATRT5 tariff aims to improve the quality of the service provided to users²³. It is therefore advisable to adapt this mechanism on a regular basis to take account of user requirements and the development of operators performance. In this respect, on every tariff update, the CRE changes the indicators and the financial incentives.

1. Quality of the quantities remotely metered at the points of delivery for consumers connected to the transmission network and transmitted the following day and quality of the global forecasts on consumption at the end of the gas day made the day before and during the day

At present, the reference taken for assessing the quality of the measurements and forecasts for customers connected to the transmission network and transmitted the day before or during the day is the value for the following day (D+1). The reference taken for assessing the quality of the data from the PITD is the definitive measurement established in M+1.

At its public consultation, the CRE proposed harmonising the reference used to calculate the quality of the data transmitted by GRTgaz and TIGF by using the definitive measurement established in M+1.

The majority of the contributors approved this measure, which increases the legibility of the indicators. Calculation of the indicators as a whole makes it possible to measure the quality of the data transmitted by GRTgaz and TIGF will take as a reference the definitive value for the month M+1, from 1st April 2015.

Similarly, the CRE has proposed aligning the calculation of the quality indicator for the measurements transmitted the following day in the model used to monitor the quality of the intra-day measurements transmitted by GRTgaz.

Instead of monitoring the percentage of compliant readings in a month, the new indicator makes it possible to monitor the percentage of information that is of very good, good and poor quality on a day-by-day basis. The previous method did not take account of any metering faults lasting for less than three days. The change introduced makes it possible to detect any deviations of more than 3%, in absolute value, between the measurement of the energy from day D transmitted on D+1 and the definitive measurement from day D transmitted in M+1, from the first day when a deviation was found.

According to this new calculation, information is said to be of very good quality if the deviation, in absolute value, between the measurement of energy on day D transmitted on day D+1 and the definitive measurement from day D transmitted in M+1 is strictly lower than 1%. If the deviation is between 1% and 3% (respectively strictly higher than 3%), the value is of good quality (respectively of poor quality). If the deviation is less than 100kWh, the information is of very good quality.

In their answers, contributors expressed a favourable opinion, while leaving it up to the CRE to define the bonus/penalty levels. The CRE therefore retained its proposal for harmonising the calculation of daily and intra-day indicators for GRTgaz and TIGF.

2. Availability of public portals and shippers

As the availability rate of the portals is mainly satisfactory, the CRE proposed removing the bonus allocated to operators for achieving the target objective for availability of the portals, and keeping the penalties. This proposal will be implemented from 1 April 2015.

In addition, the CRE proposed identifying the five most useful items of information on SMART GRTgaz and Data gas and creating an indicator for monitoring their quality. The majority of contributors welcomed this initiative, and some put forward the information that they find most useful on an everyday basis. The CRE has therefore asked the operators to determine, on *Balancing Concertation*, by 1 April 2015, a list of five items of information on SMART GRTgaz and Data gas that will be subject to a quality of service indicator, at present without any financial incentive attached.

²³ [Incentive regulation of the quality of service of natural gas network operators and ERDF - 2013 Report](#)

Finally, the CRE proposed the creation of an indicator concerning compliance with contractual deadlines for publication of notices of fulfilment and balancing. In their contributions, several shippers estimated that the quality of the notices was just as important as their publication at a set time. Other shippers highlighted the fact that the deadlines are contractual and that in this respect it was unnecessary to provide a bonus when they are met. The CRE has therefore asked the operators to present publication deadlines on within *Gas Concertation*, without them being monitored by a new indicator.

3. Monitoring of operator actions in the markets for the purpose of balancing

The CRE proposed creating an indicator measuring the difference between the price of operator actions and the average price recorded at a PEG on any given day. Initially, this indicator will not carry any financial incentive as the objective is to observe the conditions of operator action in the target balancing system. Contributors were in favour of this indicator in order to avoid operators taking action at disproportionate prices.

From 1 April 2015 GRTgaz and TIGF will introduce an indicator measuring the difference between the maximum purchase price and minimum selling price of the operator and the average weighted price of the volumes exchanged in *day ahead* during the calendar day at the concerned PEG, on Powernext. This indicator, which does not carry any financial incentive, will be regularly presented in balancing *Concertation*.

4. Difference between the line pack on D+1 and the line pack on D, at 6 hours, as a percentage of the total line pack

In the target balancing system, which will come into effect on 1st October 2015, operators will act in the markets to balance the network. The indicator for monitoring the actions of operators in balancing should not discourage operators from acting. Indeed, the sales-purchase price should not limit these actions when a physical requirement is confirmed.

In order to encourage operators to secure a constant line pack from one day to the next and to counterbalance the incentive created by the indicator for monitoring operator balancing actions in the markets, the CRE has decided to create an indicator for monitoring the line pack return from the previous day.

This indicator will be established by GRTgaz and TIGF after working in *Gaz Concertation*. It will be calculated by the difference between the line pack on D+1 and the line pack gas on D, at 6 hours, as a percentage of the total line pack, for each of the balancing zones, from 1 April 2015. It will not initially be subject to financial incentive.

5. Availability of interruptible capacity at the North-South connection

Since 1 January 2014, availability on the market by GRTgaz of additional firm capacity at the North-South link has received an incentive of €0.20/MWh above a threshold of 3 TWh, and then €0.4/MWh above 5 TWh. This monthly incentive concerns the combined volume of firm daily capacity marketed above the level of 270 GWh/d, with the exception of any conversion of interruptible capacity to firm capacity.

At its public consultation, the CRE proposed offering GRTgaz a financial incentive for maximising this global volume, by replacing the current indicator related to the quantity of additional firm capacity with an indicator related to the annual quantity of interruptible and firm capacity made available on the market above the firm capacity of 270 GWh/d.

Contributor opinion was divided regarding this measure. A slight majority was in favour of it, considering it essential to maximise North-South flow by any means, and that a financial incentive for GRTgaz would be useful from this point of view. However, many of the contributors were not in favour of this measure. Some of them believed that maximising the availability of interruptible capacity forms part of operators' regulatory obligations and that they should not receive bonuses for merely doing their job. Storengy believes that the proposed indicator is biased because it does not include capacity to and from storage in central France. For its part, GRTgaz is not in favour of such an indicator because the results depend on factors outside its scope, particularly the use by shippers of storage in central France and the Fos LNG terminals.

The CRE observes that recent developments in the world LNG market have led to a considerable reduction in the price differential between the North zone and the South zone, which has led to a fall in the use of the North-South link. In addition, if such a situation persists throughout all or part of 2015, it could bias the results of the indicator. The CRE therefore considers it premature to provide a financial incentive for this indicator. Nonetheless, it will be monitored from 1 January 2015 and its results will be presented on *Concertation Equilibrage*.

TARIFFS FOR THE USE OF THE NATURAL GAS TRANSMISSION SYSTEM

I. Definitions

System Interconnection Point (PIR):

Physical or notional interconnection point of the main transmission networks of two transmission system operators (TSO).

Regional Network Interconnection Point (PIRR):

Physical or notional interconnection point between a regional transmission network and a foreign operator network.

LNG Terminal Transmission Interface Point (PITTM):

Physical or notional interconnection point between a transmission system and several LNG terminals.

Transport Storage Interface Point (PITS):

Physical or notional interface point between a transmission system and a storage group.

Transport Production Interface Point (PITP):

Physical or notional interface point between a transmission system and a gas or LNG gas production facility.

Transport Distribution Interface Point (PITD):

Physical or notional interface point between a transmission system and a public distribution system.

Charges for entry to the main network:

TCE: capacity charge for entry to the main network, applicable to the daily capacity subscription at points of entry to the main network from a PIR or a PITTM;

TCES: capacity charge for entry to the main network from storage, applicable to the daily capacity subscription for entry to the main network from a PITS;

TCEP: capacity charge for entry to the main network from a gas production facility, applicable to the daily capacity subscription for entry to the main network from a PITP;

Charges for exit from the main network:

TCST: capacity charge for exit at the transmission network interconnection points, applicable to the daily capacity subscription for exit to a network interconnection point (PIR);

TCS: capacity charge for exit from the main network, applicable to the daily capacity subscription for exit from the main network, except to a PITS or a PIR;

TCSS capacity charge for exit from the main network to storage, applicable to the daily capacity subscription for exit from the main network to a PITS;

TP: proximity charge, applicable to quantities of gas injected at a point of entry to the transport network and extracted in an exit zone immediately within the vicinity of this point;

Charge for connection between balancing zones:

TCLZ capacity connection charge, applicable to the daily capacity subscription for connection between balancing zones of the main network of the same operator;

Regional network transmission charge:

TCR: transmission capacity charge in the regional network, applicable to the daily capacity subscription for transmission in the regional network;

Delivery charge:

TCL: delivery capacity charge, applicable to the daily capacity charge for delivery to a delivery point;

Firm capacity:

Gas transmission capacity, guaranteed under contract by the operator as uninterruptible.

Seasonal firm capacity:

Gas transmission capacity, guaranteed under contract by the operator as uninterruptible, depending on the season. This definition mainly applies to injection and withdraw capacities at the PITS marketed by GRTgaz.

Backhaul capacity on the main network:

Capacity allowing the shipper to make nominations in the opposite direction to the dominant direction of gas flow when the gas flow can only run in one direction. It may only be used, on a given day, if the global flow resulting from all nominations from shippers is in the dominant direction of the flow.

Interruptible capacity:

Gas transmission capacity that may be interrupted by the operator according to the conditions stipulated in the gas transmission system user agreement.

Returnable capacity:

Firm capacity, which the shipper agrees to return to the operator at any time on request.

Shipper:

Individual or legal entity that enters into a routing contract with an operator on the gas transmission network. The shipper is, depending on the case, the eligible customer, the supplier or their representative.

PDL "on subscription":

Delivery point on the public distribution network related to options T4 and TP of the tariffs in effect for use of the distribution networks.

PDL "not on subscription":

Delivery point on the public distribution network related to options T1, T2 and T3 of the tariffs in effect for use of the distribution networks.

Authorised revenue:

Sum of forecast capital expenditure and forecast operating expenses, plus or minus the equalisation account annuity, used to set each operator's tariff table.

II. GRTgaz network use tariffs

A. Evolution of authorised revenue

The trajectory of GRTgaz authorised revenue for the ATRT5 period is as follows:

€m	2013	2014	2015	2016
Standard capital expenditure	893.6	973.8	1044.8	1142
Net operating expenses including the "energy and CO ₂ quotas" item	766.7 125.3	740.4 104.1	746.1 114.9	CPI minus 1.45% 120.8
Equalisation account	2.2	-4.5	-18.1	-18.1
Authorised income	1662.4	1709.8	1772.8	

B. Tariff table for use of the GRTgaz network applicable from 1st April 2015

At the PIR and at the North-South link, GRTgaz may sell firm and interruptible capacity at auction, in accordance with the CAM network code. The auction reserve prices are the same as the tariffs below.

1. Routing on the main network

The tariff for use of the GRTgaz main network comprises the following charges:

- capacity charge for entry to the main network (TCE);
- capacity charge for connection between balancing zones (TCLZ);
- capacity charge for exit to the PIR (TCST);
- capacity charge for exit from the main network (TCS);
- proximity charge (TP);
- capacity charges on entry to an exit from the PITS (TCES and TCSS).

a) Capacity charge for entry to main network:

The charges applicable to annual subscriptions for daily capacity for entry to the GRTgaz main network are defined in the following table:

Entry point	Balancing zone	TCE (€/MWh/day per year or season) Firm subscriptions	TCE (coefficient on firm charge) Interruptible subscriptions
Taisnières B	North	88.82	50%
Taisnières H	North	114.19	50%
Dunkirk (PIR)	North	114.19	50%
Obergailbach	North	114.19	50%
Montoir	North	107.84	N/A
Dunkirk LNG	North	107.84	N/A
Fos	South	107.84	N/A

At the Dunkirk LNG PITTM:

- the holding of regasification capacities at an LNG terminal involves the right and obligation to subscribe, at least, to firm capacities for the relevant periods and levels from the terminal to the North zone in the GRTgaz transmission network and/or from the terminal to Belgium.

The firm entry capacities in the GRTgaz network are reserved in the form of annual or 10-day bands:

- over a period representing a whole number of years, at the firm annual subscription price at the PITTM in effect during this period;
- over a multiple period of 10 days, at the tariff of 10/365th, per 10 day segment, of the price of the annual firm subscription at the PITTM;
- at the start of each month, the operator calculates, for each shipper, the daily send out programme for the previous month. If they exceed the capacity reserved by the shipper, the latter is invoiced for an additional daily capacity subscription equal to the sum of the positive differences between the daily emissions for the previous month and the capacity reserved by the shipper, at a price equal to 1/240th of the price of the firm annual subscription to the PITTM.

At the Montoir and Fos PITTM:

- the holding of regasification capacities at an LNG terminal involves the right and obligation to subscribe to the entry capacities on the transmission network for the relevant periods and levels;
- any shipper subscribing to a continuous service with LNG terminal operators will be allocated a firm daily capacity (C) for the period of subscription to the relevant regasification capacities, equal to:

$$C = (Q_{Aexp} / Q_{TM}) * C_{PITTM}$$

Where:

Q_{Aexp} = annual regasification capacity subscribed to by the shipper at the terminals;

Q_{TM} = total annual firm technical regasification capacity of the Montoir terminal for the Montoir PITTM or sum of the total annual firm technical regasification capacity of the Fos Cavaou terminal and the total annual firm subscribed regasification capacity of the Fos Tonkin terminal for the Fos PITTM;

C_{PITTM} = firm daily capacity for entry to the PITTM.

- any reservation of capacity at the PITTM consecutive to subscription of a continuous regasification service may only be carried out for a full number of months;
- any shipper subscribing to a "band" or "spot" service with LNG terminal operators is allocated a basic firm capacity band (C) equal to the multiple of 10 days closest to the duration of the regasification capacity subscribed with LNG terminal operators. The price applicable is equal to 10/365th of the firm annual subscription price per 10-day segment;
- at the start of each month, the operator calculates, for each shipper, the daily send out programme for the previous month. If they exceed the capacity C calculated according to the methods defined above, the shipper is invoiced for an additional daily capacity subscription equal to the sum of the positive differences between the daily emissions for the previous month and the capacity C, at a price equal to 1/240th of the price of the firm annual subscription.

b) Capacity charge for connection between balancing zones:

The charges applicable to annual subscriptions for daily capacity for connection between the GRTgaz balancing zones are defined in the following table:

Connection between balancing zones	TCLZ (€/MWh/day per year)	TCLZ (firm charge coefficient)
	Firm subscriptions	Interruptible subscriptions
North to South	208.04	50%
South to North	50.00	50%

c) Capacity charge for exit to the PIR:

The charges applicable to annual subscriptions for daily capacity for exit to the PIR are defined in the following table:

Exit to PIR	Balancing zone	TCST (€/MWh/day per year)	TCST (firm charge coefficient)
		Firm subscriptions	Interruptible subscriptions
Oltingue	North	398.39	75%
Jura	South	98.61	75%
Alveringem	North	45.00	N/A

d) Capacity charge for exit from the main network:

Each exit zone from the GRTgaz main network is defined by all of the delivery points attached to it.

For each shipper and in each exit zone, the firm annual, respectively interruptible, subscription for capacities on exit from the main network should be higher than or equal to the sum of the firm annual, respectively interruptible, subscriptions for capacities for delivery in this exit zone.

The charge applicable to firm annual, respectively interruptible, subscriptions for daily capacities on exit from the GRTgaz main network is equal, for all exit zones, to €93.75/MWh/day per year, respectively €46.88/MWh/d per year.

e) Proximity charge:

The proximity charge is deducted from the monthly invoice of each concerned shipper. It is applied, for each shipper, to the quantity of gas equal, each day, to the minimum between the quantity of gas allocated at the point of entry of the transmission network and the quantity of gas withdrawn in the associated exit zone.

The proximity charge is also applied to the following entry point / exit zone pairs:

Balancing zone	Entry point	Associated exit zone	TP (€/MWh)
North	Taisnières B	Taisnières B Region	0.19
North	Taisnières H	Taisnières H Region	0.25
North	Dunkirk	Dunkirk Region	0.25
North	Obergailbach	Obergailbach Region	0.25

f) Capacity charges for entry to and exit from storage:

Each GRTgaz balancing zone has several PITS:

- the North balancing zone has four PITS: North-Atlantic, North-West, North-East, North B (L-gas);
- the South balancing zone has two PITS: South-Atlantic and South-East.

The charges (TCES and TCSS) applicable to annual subscriptions for daily capacity for exit to the PITS are defined in the following table:

For the PITS in the GRTgaz North zone:

PITS	TCES (€/MWh/day per year)	TCSS (€/MWh/day per year)
	8.17	18.39

For the PITS in the GRTgaz South zone:

PITS	TCES (€/MWh/day per year)	TCSS (€/MWh/day per year)
	9.00	20.24

For annual or multi-annual products marketed by storage operators, the annual capacities for entry to and exit from the PITS allocated to each shipper by GRTgaz are equal, respectively, to the daily nominal withdraw capacity, plus, where applicable, the daily conditional withdraw capacity, and the daily nominal injection capacity, plus, where applicable, the daily conditional injection capacity, subscribed to by this shipper with the storage operator, within the limit of the network capacities.

Annual interruptible capacities for entry to and exit from the PITS are marketed in the North Atlantic and South Atlantic PITS. These annual interruptible capacities are only marketed when all firm annual capacities have been subscribed to. The price applicable to annual interruptible subscriptions to daily capacity for entry at the North Atlantic and South Atlantic PITS is equal to 75% of the price of the firm annual subscription to daily capacity. The price applicable to annual interruptible subscriptions to daily capacity for exit at the North Atlantic and South Atlantic PITS is equal to 50% of the price of the firm annual subscription to daily capacity.

g) Backhaul capacities on the main network:

The price applicable to annual subscriptions for daily backhaul capacity is equal to 20% of the price of the annual firm subscription to daily capacity in the dominant direction, with the exception of the Alveringem exit point where the coefficient is fixed at 125%.

Backhaul capacity exists at the following points on the GRTgaz network:

backhaul subscriptions	firm charge coefficient	
Entry points	Taisnières H	20%
	Obergailbach	20%
Exit points	Alveringem	125%
Exit to PIR	Oltingue	20%
	Jura	20%

h) Returnable capacities on the main network:

At the Dunkirk PIR, firm capacities are defined, which are known as "returnable" and which the shipper undertakes to return at any time, in the event of a request from GRTgaz, for a period of one, two, three or four years.

For any shipper that has subscribed to more than 20% of the firm annual capacities marketable at the Dunkirk PIR, a 20% fraction of the part of its subscription above 20% of the firm annual capacities marketable at this point is converted into returnable capacity.

The price of an annual returnable capacity is equal to 90% of the price of the corresponding firm annual capacity.

The rules for return and subscription of these capacities are defined by GRTgaz, on an objective and transparent basis, preventing any discrimination, and are published on its website.

2. **Routing on the regional network**

The firm capacity, respectively interruptible, subscription for transmission on the regional network is equal, for each delivery point, to the firm capacity, respectively interruptible, subscription for delivery at this point.

a) Firm annual subscription:

The charge applicable to the firm annual subscriptions for daily transmission capacity on the regional network is the product of the unit charge, fixed at €67.61/MWh/day per year, and the regional tariff level (NTR) at the point of delivery in question:

	TCR (€/MWh/day per year)
GRTgaz	67.61 x NTR

The list of delivery points on the GRTgaz network, accompanied by their exit zone and their NTR value, appears in the appendix to this document.

When a new delivery point is created, GRTgaz calculates the value of the NTR in a transparent and non-discriminatory way, based on a calculation method published on its website, and inform the CRE of the result.

b) Interruptible annual subscription:

For any interruptible annual transmission capacity subscribed to on the regional network, the capacity charge for transmission on the regional network is reduced by 50%.

The conditions of interruptibility on the regional network are defined by GRTgaz, on an objective and transparent basis, preventing any discrimination, and are published on its website.

3. **Gas delivery**

a) For consumers connected to the transmission network and the PIRR:

For shippers supplying end consumers connected to the transmission network and the PIRR, the delivery charge is made up of:

- a fixed charge equal to €5,352.81/year and per delivery item;
- a charge applicable to daily capacity subscriptions for delivery.

The charge applicable to firm annual subscriptions for daily capacity for delivery is defined in the following table:

	TCL (€/MWh/day per year)
Highly modulated consumers*	29.00
Industrial consumers	27.74
PIRR	35.61

* Consumers having on average a daily modulated volume higher than 0.8 GWh per day of operation (see paragraph 17)

For any interruptible annual delivery capacity subscribed to, the capacity charge for delivery is reduced by 50%.

Any shipper supplying one or more end consumers connected to the GRTgaz transmission network will be allocated delivery capacities corresponding to their requirements.

If several shippers simultaneously supply an end consumer connected to the transmission network or a PIRR, the fixed charge is split in proportion to their delivery capacity subscriptions.

b) For the PITD:

For shippers supplying the PITD, the charge applicable to firm annual subscriptions for daily capacity for delivery is defined in the following table:

	TCL (€/MWh/day per year)
PITD	35.61

In application of the standardised system for subscription to transmission capacities at the PITD, in each PITD, the firm annual delivery capacity ("standardised capacity") is allocated to each shipper by the operators. It is equal to the sum of:

- the annual capacities subscribed to on the distribution network for the delivery points (PDL) "on subscription" supplied downstream of the PITD in question;
- the capacities calculated by GRTgaz for the PDL "not on subscription" supplied downstream of the PITD in question, by multiplying the peak daily consumption of the PDL "not on subscription" by the corresponding adjustment coefficient "A".

A change to the coefficient A may take place on 1 April each year via a CRE decision at the proposal of GRTgaz for its balancing zones and for each distribution network operator present in these zones.

4. Summary of the GRTgaz schedule of tariffs as of 1 April 2015

Annual capacity	Tariff charges in €/MWh/day per year
PITTM Montoir, Fos, Dunkerque GNL	107.84
PIR Entries Taisnières H, Dunkerque, Obergailbach, Taisnières B	114.19 88.82
PIR Exits Oltingue Jura Alveringem	398.39 98.61 45.00
GRTgaz North Zone PITS Entry Exit	8.17 18.39
GRTgaz South Zone PITS Entry Exit	9.00 20.24
GRTgaz North- GRTgaz South Connection North to South Direction South to North Direction	208.04 50.00
Main network Exit	93.75
Regional Network Transport	67.61
Delivery Industrial Customers Highly modulated sites Transport Distribution Interface Point (PITD), Regional Network Interconnection Point (PIRR)	27.74 29.00 35.61 35.61 35.61

5. Contracted quarterly capacities

- At the PIRs subject to quarterly auctions and at the North-South link:

The reserve price for auctions for quarterly products shall equal:

- 1/3 of the annual contract tariff if the interconnection is not congested;
- 1/4 of the annual contract tariff if the interconnection is congested;

A point shall be considered congested if, upon allocation of the fixed annual products, the capacity sale price is strictly above the reserve price.

- At PIRs not subject to quarterly auctions:

The charges applicable to fixed quarterly contracts for daily capacity shall equal 1/3 of the corresponding annual charges.

- At the PITS:

For products with a duration of less than one year marketed by storage operators, GRTgaz shall allocate quarterly PITS entry and exit capacities equal to the nominal withdrawal and injection capacities to each shipper. The price applicable to quarterly PITS capacity contracts shall be equal to 1/3 of the corresponding annual contract price.

6. Contracted monthly capacities

- At the PIRs and at the North-South connection in the South to North Direction:

The charges applicable to monthly contracts for daily capacity shall be equal to 1/8 of the corresponding annual charges.

- At the North-South connection in the North to South direction:

The charges applicable to monthly contracts for daily capacity at the North-South connection shall be equal to 1/12 of the corresponding annual contract.

- At the PITS:

For products with a duration of less than one quarter marketed by storage operators, GRTgaz shall allocate monthly PITS entry and exit capacities equal to the nominal withdrawal and injection capacities to each shipper. The price applicable to monthly PITS capacity contracts shall be equal to 1/8 of the corresponding annual contract price.

- At the main network exit on the regional network, and at delivery:

The charges applicable to fixed monthly contracts for daily capacity shall be the charges applicable to the corresponding fixed annual contracts, multiplied by the following coefficients:

Month	Monthly charge as a proportion of the annual charge
January – February	8/12
December	4/12
March – November	2/12
April – May – June – September – October	1/12
July – August	0.5/12

7. Contracted daily capacities

- At the PIRs and at the North-South Connection:

The charges applicable to daily contracts for daily capacity shall be 1/30 of the price for the corresponding monthly charge.

- At the PITS:

The daily PITS entry and exit capacities allocated to each shipper by GRTgaz shall be equal to, respectively, the daily withdrawal capacity and the daily injection capacity allocated by the storage operator in addition to the corresponding annual, quarterly, and monthly capacities, up to the limit of the network capacities.

The charge applicable to daily contracts for daily PITS capacity shall be equal to 1/240 of the price for the contracted fixed annual capacity at these points.

- At the main network exit, on the regional network, and at delivery:

GRTgaz shall market daily capacity contracts to fulfil occasional and exceptional end-customer needs.

The charges applicable to fixed daily contracts for daily capacity at the main network exit, for transport on the regional network, and for delivery shall be equal to 1/30 of the fixed monthly charge for the corresponding month.

The charges applicable to interruptible daily contracts for daily capacity at the main network exit, for transport on the regional network, and for delivery, shall be equal to 50% of the corresponding fixed daily capacity charge.

GRTgaz shall market daily interruptible capacity when all marketable fixed daily capacities have been contracted for the day in question.

8. Short-term marketing of daily and intra-day capacity

- “Use it and buy it” (UBI)

Each day at the PIRs and at the North-South connection, GRTgaz shall market unsold capacity and contracted capacity that was not registered the previous day for the following day as interruptible, at the tariffs defined in paragraph 7 for the corresponding contracted daily capacities.

GRTgaz shall define the operating rules for the UBI service, based on objective and transparent criteria, to prevent any discrimination, and shall publish these rules on its website.

- Auctions

At the PIRs, and at the North-South connection, GRTgaz may use auctions to market remaining daily capacity after the end of the marketing period for daily capacity at the regulated tariff.

GRTgaz shall define the operating rules for the auction mechanism for daily capacity, based on objective and transparent criteria, to prevent any discrimination, and shall publish these rules on its website. The reserve price used for the auction mechanism shall be equal to the tariffs defined in paragraph 7 for the corresponding daily contracts.

- Implementation of the provisions in the CAM code on intra-day capacity

If the provisions of the CAM code on intra-day capacity are implemented, the reserve price for this capacity shall be equal to the tariffs defined in paragraph 7 for the corresponding daily capacity contracts in relation to the number of hours remaining the gas day.

9. Contracted hourly delivery capacities

Hourly delivery capacities shall only apply to end-customers connected to the transmission system.

All annual, monthly, or daily hourly delivery capacity contracts shall include a hourly delivery capacity equal to 1/20 of the contracted daily delivery capacity (except in special cases where the hourly capacity is not available).

To receive a higher hourly capacity where possible on the network, the shipper must pay a price supplement p , equal to:

$$p = (C_{max} - C) \times 10 \times (TCL + TCR)$$

Where:

C_{max} : Hourly delivery capacity requested by the shipper.

C : Hourly delivery capacity reserved through an annual, monthly, or daily contract for daily delivery capacity.

TCL : Annual, monthly, or daily charge for daily delivery capacity.

TCR : Annual, monthly, or daily charge for daily transmission capacity on the regional network.

10. Short-notice interruptible distribution offer

An optional interruptible distribution offer is proposed for customers connected to the GRTgaz H gas network that simultaneously meet the following conditions:

- The annual contracted daily delivery capacity is greater than 10 GWh/day;
- The site's connection point to the GRTgaz network is less than 50 km as the crow flies from a PITTM or one of the following entry points: Dunkirk, Taisnières H or Obergailbach.

To be eligible for this offer, the customer in question must commit to contracting this offer or having a shipper contract it with GRTgaz before the connection decision is made.

This offer sets out a reduction or interruption in supply to the sites in question by request from GRTgaz, with advance notice of at least 2 hours, when both of the following conditions are met:

- The quantity of gas physically injected into the network at the closest entry point is less than the contracted daily delivery capacity for the sites benefiting from this interruptible offer within the scope of this entry point;
- The day's temperature is equal to or below the statistical average daily temperature more than 20 days per year, with a 2% risk of occurrence.

GRTgaz shall define the interruption conditions, based on objective and transparent criteria to prevent any discrimination, and shall publish these conditions on its website.

Shippers contracting this offer shall benefit from a tariff reduction equal to the delivery capacity that they contracted for this delivery point, multiplied by the sum of:

- 50% of the main network exit capacity charge;
- 50% of the main network entry capacity charge at the nearest entry point.

For a single site, a shipper may not accumulate the tariff reduction granted under this optional offer with tariff reductions granted for:

- Interruptible distribution on regional networks;
- The proximity charge for customers located within the "Dunkerque Region", "Taisnières H Region", or "Obergailbach Region" exit zones;
- The temporary short-notice interruptible distribution offer in the GRTgaz South zone.

Termination of this optional offer shall be subject to a minimum of four years' advance notice.

11. Temporary short-notice interruptible distribution offer in the GRTgaz South zone

Until the creation of a single marketplace in France, an optional interruptible distribution offer is proposed temporarily for highly modulated customers connected to the network in the GRTgaz South zone with an annual contracted daily delivery capacity greater than 10 GWh/day.

This offer sets out a reduction or interruption in supply to the sites in question by request from GRTgaz, with advance notice of at least 2 hours, when the interruption rate for interruptible capacity at the North-South connection point in the North to South direction is 100%.

GRTgaz shall define the interruption conditions, based on objective and transparent criteria to prevent any discrimination, and shall publish these conditions on its website.

Shippers contracting this offer shall benefit from a tariff reduction equal to the delivery capacity that they contracted for this delivery point, multiplied by the sum of:

- 50% of the main network exit capacity charge;
- 25% of the regulated tariff at the North-South connection point in the North to South direction.

For a single site, a shipper may not accumulate the tariff reduction granted under this optional offer with tariff reductions granted for:

- Interruptible distribution on regional networks;
- The short-notice interruptible distribution offer.

12. Daily contract offer for short-notice daily delivery capacity

An optional short-notice daily delivery capacity contract is proposed for customers connected to the GRTgaz transmission system.

This offer provides that GRTgaz shall agree to respond to a contract request for daily delivery capacity with a shorter minimum advance notice than that set out in the GRTgaz transmission system usage contract.

The customer and GRTgaz shall contract this offer for one year at a price of €2,000 per year. This offer shall be implemented according to the following tariff conditions.

When the contract request reaches GRTgaz with advance notice:

- Between the standard advance notice set out in the GRTgaz transmission system usage contract and 9 am the second working day before the day in question as per the request, the applicable tariff shall be the one set out in this tariff;
- After 9 am on the second working day before the day in question as per the request, the applicable tariff shall be increased by 20%.

13. Gas injection into the transmission system from a gas production facility

The charges applicable to contracted annual GRTgaz network PITP (Transport Production Interface Point) daily entry capacity shall be as follows:

- For PITPs with a network injection capacity less than or equal to 5 GWh/day, the applicable rate shall be €9.85/MWh/day per year;
- For PITPs with a network injection capacity greater than 5 GWh/day, the applicable rate shall be defined through a special study;
- For PITPs for biomethane production facilities with a network injection capacity of less than or equal to 5 GWh/day, the applicable rate shall be 0.

14. Gas quality conversion

a) H gas to L gas peak conversion service

GRTgaz markets a fixed annual "peak" H gas to B gas conversion service. This service is available to all shippers having H gas in the North balancing zone.

The rate for this tariff is defined in the following table:

	Capacity charge (€/MWh/day per year)	Quantity charge (€/MWh)
"Peak" Service	161.60	0.02

GRTgaz shall define the operating rules for the H gas to L gas quality conversion service, based on objective and transparent criteria to prevent any discrimination, and shall publish these rules on its website.

b) L gas to H gas conversion service:

The L gas to H gas conversion service is available to shippers providing their own L gas from the Taisnières L PIR or a PITP, up to the limit of the physical quantities of L gas in question.

The rate for the L gas to H gas quality conversion service is as follows:

- For the annual offer, a charge proportional to the contracted annual capacity of €25.59/MWh/day per year;
- For the monthly offer, a charge proportional to the contracted monthly capacity of €3.20/MWh/day per year.

The L gas quantities physically converted to H gas shall be verified after the fact based on a calculation of the daily difference between the quantities converted and the quantities allocated to Taisnières L and to the PITPs for the L gas network, between 1 April of year N and 31 March of year N+1.

The quantities converted, from which the quantities allocated to Taisnières L and to the PITPs for the L gas network between 1 April of year N and 31 March of year N+1 will be deducted, shall be entered into a cumulative daily account:

- Each day there is a positive balance in this cumulative account, the shipper shall be invoiced a penalty of €1/MWh up to the cumulative daily imbalance observed, until it is rebalanced;
- If there is a positive balance on 31 March of year N+1, the balance shall be carried forward to the period between 1 April of year N+1 and 31 March of year N+2;
- If there is a negative or zero balance on 31 March of year N+1, the account shall be reset to zero on 1 April of year N+1.

c) Contractual post hoc L to H conversion rate:

A contractual L gas to H gas conversion rate shall be billed *after the fact* to any shipper using the Taisnières L PIR, Sédiane L PITS, and physical conversion tools (H to L peak converter) leading to injection of a quantity of L gas into the L network greater than the total consumption of its customers connected to the L network.

This rate shall apply to the difference calculated daily, for each shipper, between the quantity of L gas injected into the network and the total consumption by its customers connected to the L network. However, this rate shall not apply to quantities of B gas injected into the PITPs, or to shippers providing GRTgaz with an H gas to L gas exchange service.

This rate shall not apply to L gas imbalances that can be attributed to a revision of nominations following a request from GRTgaz as described in chapter d) below.

The rate for this tariff is set at €1.05/MWh after application of the following tolerance level

Contracted delivery capacity on the L gas network	≤ 0.5 GWh/day	> 0.5 GWh/day and ≤ 1 GWh/day	> 1 GWh/day
Tolerance before application of the conversion price	15%	10%	2.5%

d) Control of nominations on the L gas physical infrastructure:

In circumstances where the physical balance of the L network so requires, GRTgaz may require shippers with capacity on the L transmission system physical infrastructure to revise their nominations on this infrastructure up or down.

15. Optional balancing tolerance

GRTgaz markets an optional balancing service in proportion to delivery capacity, with a rate equal to €23.95/MWh/day per year.

16. Intra-day flexibility service for highly variable sites.

The intra-day flexibility service shall apply to customers connected to the transmission system that have a variable daily volume greater than 0.8 GWh.

For existing sites, GRTgaz shall evaluate this criterion based on the consumption history for the preceding year. For newly connected sites, this criterion shall be evaluated based on the variable daily volume for the operating days declared by the site, and then based on a quarterly statement, retroactive to the past period when the criterion is achieved.

Operators of sites contracting the intra-day flexibility service must declare an hourly consumption profile to TSO the day before for the next day and, where applicable, a new profile during the day, in compliance with the published advance notice deadlines. A site shall not be required to send GRTgaz a new hourly consumption profile for any change in the site's hourly consumption that is less than ± 10% of its contracted hourly capacity.

GRTgaz shall not invoice for the intra-day flexibility service.

C. Update of the GRTgaz schedule of tariffs as of 1 April 2016

In addition to structural updates that the CRE may make, the GRTgaz schedule of tariffs shall be updated on 1 April of each year starting on 1 April 2016, according to the following procedures:

1. Update of standard capital expenditures

The capital expenditures considered for updates to the schedule of tariffs on 1 April 2016 shall be those defined in the table in paragraph A, "Authorised income trajectory".

2. Update of net operating expenses

For 2016, net operating expenses (OPEX) shall be updated as follows, according to the rules set out by ATRT5:

- Net OPEX for 2016 shall be calculated by applying a variation percentage equal to the CPI -1.45% to the OPEX for 2015, where CPI is the average annual variation in the consumer price index excluding tobacco actually observed for the previous calendar year, as calculated by the French National Statistics Office, INSEE, for all households throughout France²⁴. If the observed CPI value is not available at the time of the tariff update, the CRE shall use the forecast CPI adopted for the draft finance law. The difference between the inflation actually observed and the forecast from the draft finance law shall be 100% hedged by the income and expenditure equalisation account;
- The difference between the forecast "energy and CO₂ quotas" entry used in the net OPEX trajectory (defined in the table in paragraph A, "Authorised income trajectory") and the revision of the forecast for this entry for 2016 shall be added to the net OPEX for 2016.

If any potential charges related to the flexibility of the L gas system increase over the tariff period - in application of contracts, if signed between GRTgaz and GDF Suez, that the CRE had approved in advance - these additional charges shall be taken into consideration in the annual update following this increase.

3. Inclusion of the equalisation account balance

The update of the schedule of tariffs on 1 April 2016 shall include the remainder from the previous overall equalisation account balance, the difference between the definitive 2014 equalisation account and the 2014 equalisation account used to set the tariff on 1 April 2015, and the provisional 2015 equalisation account.

The overall equalisation account balance shall be the equalisation account total calculated for the past year, plus the equalisation account not cleared for previous years.

The CRE shall calculate the equalisation account for each past year in consideration of the reference amounts for each entry in question and of the hedge ratios defined below:

²⁴ The average annual variation for year A-1 equals the change rate in percentage of the average annual index, corresponding to the simple arithmetic mean of the 12 monthly indices for the year, i.e. from January through December, of consumer prices excluding tobacco for all households throughout France (Series No. 641194), between years A-2 and A-1.

€m	GRTgaz			
	2013	2014	2015	2016
Downstream distribution income, 100% hedged	1,149.4	1,204.3	1277.7	
Upstream distribution income, 50% hedged	481.3	493.0	486.0	
Income from the sale of additional capacity and costs generated by capacity repurchases, 50% hedged	0	0	0	0
Income from CCCG and TAC connection, 100% hedged	0.9	3.3	12.3	14.5
Standard capital expenditures, 100% hedged	893.6	973.8	1044.8	1142
Mechanical energy expenses and difference between income and expenses for CO ₂ quotas, 80% hedged	125.3	104.1	114.9	120.8
Expenses for inter-operator contracts, 100% covered	33	33.6	34.2	34.8
Expenses for B gas network flexibility, 100% covered where applicable	0	0	0	0

An interest rate equal to the no-risk rate, or 4%, shall apply annually to the overall equalisation account balance.

4. Update of contracted capacity assumptions

Annual contracted capacity assumptions will be revised for the update to the schedule of tariffs on 1 April 2016.

III. TIGF network use tariff

The ATRT5 tariff for use of the TIGF network defined below shall apply for a period of approximately four years.

A. Evolution of authorised income

The authorised TIGF income trajectory for the ATRT5 period is as follows:

In €m	2013	2014	2015	2016
Standard capital expenditures	143.8	157.3	164.5	176.8
Net operating expenses including the "energy and CO ₂ quotas" entry	64.2 6.3	70.9 10	74 11.4	CPI+2.45% 6
Equalisation account	-3.2	-0.7	-1.3	-1.3
Authorised income	204.9	227.5	237.2	

B. Tariff table for use of the GRTgaz network applicable from 1st April 2015

At the PIRINEOS interconnection point, TIGF may auction fixed and interruptible capacity, in accordance with the CAM network code. The reserve prices for the auction shall be equal to the tariffs below.

1. Distribution on the main network

The TIGF main network use tariff shall include the following charges:

- Main network entry capacity charge (TCE);
- PIR exit capacity charge (TCST);
- Main network exit capacity charge (TCS);

- Proximity charge (TP);
- PITS entry and exit capacity charges (TCES and TCSS).

Seasonal products are no longer marketed at the interconnection with Spain. For previously contracted seasonal capacities, the tariff shall be equal to:

- For the summer season, 7/12 of the annual tariff;
- For the winter season, 5/12 of the annual tariff.

a) Main network entry capacity charge (TCE):

The charges applicable to annual contracts for TIGF main network daily entry capacities are defined in the following table:

Entry point	TCE (€/MWh/day per year) Fixed contracts	TCE (coefficient applied to the fixed charge) Interruptible contracts
	Annual	Annual
PIRINEOS	114.19	75 %

b) PIR exit capacity charges:

The charges applicable to annual contracts for PIR daily exit capacities are defined in the following table:

PIR	TCST (€/MWh/day per year) Fixed contracts	TCST (coefficient applied to the fixed charge) Interruptible contracts
	Annual	Annual
PIRINEOS	496.39	75 %

c) Main network exit capacity charge:

Each exit zone on the TIGF main network is defined by the set of delivery points attached to it.

For each shipper and each exit zone, the contracted fixed annual main network exit capacity must be greater than or equal to the sum of contracted fixed annual delivery capacities in the exit zone.

The charge applicable to contracted fixed annual TIGF main network daily exit capacity shall be €93.75/MWh/day per year for all zones.

Additionally, TIGF markets annual interruptible main network exit capacities. For each shipper, the contracted capacities must be equal to the contracted annual interruptible delivery capacities. The contracted annual interruptible main network exit capacities shall be marketed at 50% of the tariff charged for the corresponding fixed annual capacity.

Storage entry and exit capacity charges:

The TIGF transmission system includes a PITS: Southwest Storage

The charges (TCES and TCSS) applicable to annually contracted daily PITS entry and exit capacities are defined in the following table:

PITS	TCES (€/MWh/day per year)	TCSS (€/MWh/day per year)
Southwest Storage	11.96	26.92

For the annual and multi-year products marketed by the storage operators, the annual PITS entry and exit capacities allocated to each shipper by TIGF shall be, respectively, the nominal daily withdrawal capacity, plus the peak daily withdrawal capacity where applicable, and the nominal daily injection capacity, contracted by this shipper with the storage operator, up to the limit of the network capacity.

No annual interruptible PITS entry and exit capacity shall be marketed.

2. Distribution on the regional network

The contracted fixed or interruptible regional network transport capacity for each delivery point shall be equal to the contracted fixed or interruptible delivery capacity at this point.

a) Fixed annual contract:

The charges applicable to annually contracted fixed regional network daily transport capacity shall be the product of the individual charge, set at €62.74/MWh/day per year, and the regional tariff level (NTR) for the delivery point in question:

	TCR (€/MWh/day per year)
TIGF	62.74 x NTR

The list of delivery points on the TIGF network, along with their exit zone and NTR value, is listed in the appendix to this document.

When a new delivery point is created, TIGF will calculate the NTR value transparently and in a non-discriminatory way, based on a calculation method published on its website, and it shall communicate the result to the CRE.

b) Interruptible annual contract:

For any annually contracted interruptible regional network transport capacity, the regional network transport capacity charges shall be reduced by 50%.

TIGF shall define the regional network interruption conditions based on objective and transparent criteria to prevent any discrimination, and shall publish these conditions on its website.

3. Gas delivery

a) For customers connected to the transmission system:

For shippers supplying end-customers connected to the transmission system, delivery charges shall consist of:

- A fixed charge of €2,620.10/year per delivery point;
- A charge applicable to contracted daily delivery capacities.

The charge applicable to annually contracted fixed daily delivery capacities is defined in the following table:

	TCL (€/MWh/day per year)
TIGF	23.69

For any annually contracted interruptible delivery capacity, the delivery capacity charge shall be reduced by 50%.

All shippers supplying one or more end customers connected to the TIGF transmission system shall be allocated delivery capacities corresponding to their needs.

If several shippers simultaneously supply a single end-customer connected to the transmission system, the fixed charge shall be divided in proportion to their contracted delivery capacities.

b) For the PITDs:

For shippers supplying PITDs, the charge applicable to the annually contracted fixed daily delivery capacity is defined in the following table:

	TCL (€/MWh/day per year)
TIGF	30.79

For any annually contracted interruptible delivery capacity, the delivery capacity charge shall be reduced by 50%.

In application of the standardised PITD transport capacity contract system, at each PITD a contracted annual fixed delivery capacity ("standardised capacity") shall be allocated to each shipper by the TSO. It shall be equal to the sum of:

- The contracted annual capacities on the distribution network for the "contract" delivery points (PDL) supplied downstream from the PITD in question;
- The capacities calculated by TIGF for the "non-contract" PDLs supplied downstream from the PITD in question, by multiplying the peak daily consumption of the "non-contract" PDLs by the corresponding adjustment coefficient "A".

The adjustment coefficient "A" may be updated on 1 April of each year by a CRE decision on a proposal from TIGF for its balancing zone and for each distribution network manager present on the given zone.

4. Summary of the TIGF schedule of tariffs as of 1 April 2015

Annual capacity	Tariff charges in €/MWh/day per year
PIR Entries PIRINEOS	114.19
PIR Exits PIRINEOS	496.39
TIGF Zone PITS Entry	11.96
Exit	26.92
Main network Exit	93.75
Regional Network Transport	62.74
Delivery Industrial Customers	23.69
PITD	30.79

5. Contracted quarterly capacities

At the PIRINEOS PIR, TIGF offers quarterly products marketed at auction, in accordance with the CAM network code.

- At the PIRINEOS PIR:

The reserve price for auctions for quarterly products shall equal:

- 1/3 of the tariff for the annual contract if the interconnection is not congested;
- 1/4 of the tariff for the annual contract if the interconnection is congested;

The PIRINEOS PIR shall be considered congested if, upon allocation of the annual fixed products, the capacity sale price is strictly above the reserve price.

- At the PITS

For products with a duration of less than one year marketed by storage operators, TIGF shall allocate each shipper quarterly PITS entry and exit capacities equal to the nominal withdrawal and injection capacities. The price applicable to contracted quarterly PITS capacities shall be equal to 1/3 of the price of the corresponding annual contract.

6. Contracted monthly capacities

- At the PIRINEOS PIR:

The charge applicable to monthly contracts for daily capacity shall be equal to 1/8 of the corresponding annual charge.

- At the PITS:

For products with a duration of less than one quarter marketed by storage operators, TIGF shall allocate each shipper monthly PITS entry and exit capacities equal to the nominal withdrawal and injection capacities. The price applicable to contracted monthly PITS capacities shall be equal to 1/8 of the price of the corresponding annual contract.

- At the main network exit, on the regional network, and at delivery:

The charge applicable to fixed monthly contracts for daily capacities shall be equal to the corresponding applicable fixed annual contract charge, multiplied by the following coefficients:

Month	Monthly charge as a proportion of the annual charge
January – February	8/12
December	4/12
March – November	2/12
April – May – June – September – October	1/12
July – August	0.5/12

7. Contracted daily capacities

- At the entry point and at the exit to the PIRINEOS PIR:

The reserve auction price for daily products shall be equal to 1/30 of the corresponding monthly contract charge.

- At the PITS:

The daily PITS entry and exit capacities allocated to each shipper by TIGF shall be, respectively, the daily withdrawal capacity and the daily injection capacity allocated by the storage operator in addition to the corresponding annual, quarterly, and monthly capacities, up to the network capacity limit.

The charge applicable to daily contracts for daily PITS capacity shall be equal to 1/240 of the fixed annual contract price for these points.

- At the main network exit, on the regional network, and at delivery:

TIGF shall market daily capacity contracts to fulfil occasional and exceptional end-customer needs.

The charges applicable to fixed daily contracts for daily capacity at the main network exit, for transport on the regional network, and for delivery shall be equal to 1/30 of the corresponding fixed monthly contract charge.

The charges applicable to interruptible daily contracts for daily capacity at the main network exit, for transport on the regional network, and for delivery, shall be 50% of the corresponding fixed daily capacity charge.

TIGF shall market daily interruptible capacity when all fixed marketable daily capacities have been contracted for the day in question.

8. Procedures for short-term marketing of daily and inter-daily capacity

- "Use it and buy it" (UBI)

At PIR PIRINEOS, unsold capacity and capacity contracted but not nominated the previous day for the following day is marketed in interruptible form, each day, by TIGF, at a price equal to that defined in paragraph 7 for contracts for corresponding daily capacity.

The functioning rules for the UBI service are defined by TIGF, on an objective and transparent basis that prevents any discrimination, and are made public on its Internet site.

- Sale by auction

At PIR PIRINEOS, TIGF may auction daily capacity that remains available after the end of the period for marketing daily capacity at the price defined in paragraph 7 for contracts for corresponding daily capacity.

The functioning rules for the mechanism for auctioning daily capacity are defined by TIGF on an objective and transparent basis preventing any discrimination, and are made public on its Internet site.

- Implementation of the provisions of the CAM code concerning inter-day capacity

In the case where the provisions of the CAM code concerning inter-day capacity are implemented, the reserve price for this capacity will be equal to the price defined in paragraph 7 for contracts for corresponding daily capacity, related to the number of hours remaining in the gas day.

9. Contract for hourly delivery capacity

Hourly delivery capacity applies only to final consumers connected to the transport network.

Any annual, monthly or daily contract for daily delivery capacity gives an entitlement to an hourly delivery capacity equal to 1/20th the daily capacity contracted (except in the specific case where this hourly capacity is not available).

To benefit, to the extent that the network makes this possible, from greater hourly capacity, the shipper must pay a price supplement p , equal to:

$$p = (C_{max} - C) \times 10 \times (TCL + TCR)$$

Where:

C_{max} : Hourly delivery capacity requested by the shipper.

C : Hourly delivery capacity reserved through the annual, monthly or daily delivery capacity contract.

TCL : Annual, monthly or daily charge for daily delivery capacity.

TCR : Annual, monthly or daily charge for daily delivery capacity for transport on the regional network.

10. Injection of gas into the transport network from a gas production facility

The charges applicable to annual contracts for daily capacity on input to TIGF's network from the PITP are as follows:

- for the PITP for which the input capacity to the network is less than or equal to 5 GWh/d, the charge applicable is €9.85 per MWh/day per year;
- for the PITP for which the input capacity to the network is greater than 5 GWh/d, the definition of the applicable charge will be the subject of a specific study;
- for the PITP concerning installations producing biomethane for which the input capacity to the network is less than or equal to 5 GWh/d, the charge applicable is equal to 0.

C. Update of the TIGF schedule of tariffs as of 1 April 2016

As well as changes to the structure that may be decided by the CRE, TIGF's schedule of tariffs is updated on 1 April of each year from 1 April 2016 according to the procedures below:

1. Update to standard capital expenditure

For 2016, the capital expenditure used to update the pricelist on 1 April of each year is that defined in the table in paragraph A "Authorised revenue trajectory".

2. Update to net operating expenses

For the year 2016, net operating expenses (OPEX) are developing as follows, according to the rules specified by ATRT5:

- the net OPEX for 2016 is calculated by applying, to the OPEX for 2015, a variation percentage equal to CPI +2.45%, where CPI corresponds to the average annual variation actually observed on the previous calendar year of the consumer price index excluding tobacco, as calculated by INSEE for all households in the whole of France²⁵. If the ascertained value of the CPI is not available at the time of the price update, the CRE will use the CPI forecast used in the draft finance act. The difference between actually-observed inflation and the forecast in the draft finance act will be covered at 100% by the Income and Expenditure Equalisation Account;
- to this amount of net OPEX for 2016 is added the difference between the projected item "energy and CO₂ quotas" used in the net OPEX trajectory (defined in the table in paragraph A "Authorised revenue trajectory") and the revision to the forecast for this item for 2016.

3. Inclusion of the balance of the Income and Expenditure Equalisation Account

The update to the schedule of tariffs on 1 April 2016 will take into account the residual balance of the previous overall equalisation account, the discrepancy between the definitive 2014 equalisation account and the 2014 equalisation account used to fix the tariffs on 1 April 2015, as well as the provisional 2015 equalisation account.

The equalisation account is calculated by the CRE for each elapsed year, taking into account, for each item concerned, the reference amounts and rates of coverage defined below:

in €m	TIGF			
	2013	2014	2015	2016
Income from transportation downstream, covered at 100%	110.5	120.3	134.9	
Income from transportation upstream, covered at 50%	91.3	103.3	100.5	
Income related to sales of additional capacity and costs generated by capacity repurchase, covered at 50%	0	0	0	0
Income from connecting CCCG and TAC, covered at 100%	0	0	0	0
Standardised capital expenditure, covered at 100%	143.8	157.3	164.5	176.8
Expenditure for motive energy and variation between income and expenditure related to CO ₂ quotas covered at 80%	6.3	10	11.4	6
Income related to inter-operator contracts, covered at 100%	33.1	33.8	34.4	35.1

A rate of interest equal to a riskless rate, representing 4% nominal before tax, is applied annually to the overall balance of the Income and Expenditure Equalisation Account.

²⁵ The annual variation over the year A-1 is equal to the rate of change, by percentage, of the annual average index corresponding to the simple arithmetic mean of the 12 monthly indexes for the year, namely from January to December, of the consumer prices excluding tobacco for all households in the whole of France (series n°641194), between years A-2 and A-1.

4. Update to capacity contracting estimates

The annual estimates for contracts for capacity will be reviewed to update the schedule of tariffs on 1 April 2016.

IV. Redistribution of surplus auction income

A. Reminder on the calculation of unitary amounts applicable from 1 October 2014 to 30 September 2015

The unitary redistribution amounts are calculated until 30 September 2015 according to the procedures specified by the deliberations of the CRE on 29 January 2014 and 18 June 2014.

B. Auction income surpluses

The price paid by a shipper before obtaining capacity during CAM auctions is equal to the amount of the auction premium and the regulated price in force at the time of use of the capacity.

The excess income related to capacity auctions is equal to the auction premium in €/MWh/d, multiplied by the capacity sold, in MWh/d.

The surpluses received:

- on the North-South link in the North to South direction, at the interconnection with Spain and PIR Jura will be redistributed to shippers delivering to final customers in the zones GRTgaz South and TIGF, in proportion to the volumes consumed in the zones GRTgaz South and TIGF for the period in question;
- on the North-South link in the South to North direction and two interconnections in the zone GRTgaz North will be redistributed to shippers delivering to final customers in the zone GRTgaz North, in proportion to the volumes consumed in zone GRTgaz North for the period in question.

C. Calculation of unitary amounts applicable from 1 October 2015 to 30 September 2016

1. General principles

The surplus income related to capacity auctions will include, from 1 October 2015:

- surplus income from auctions of quarterly and annual capacity for the period from 1 October 2015 to 30 September 2016;
- surplus income from auctions of monthly and daily capacity over the period from 1 October 2014 to 30 June 2015;
- the variations observed between the redistribution amounts realised and the redistribution amounts received by the TSO, from 1 October 2014 to 30 June 2015.

The unitary redistribution amount is equal to the quotient of the surplus income to be redistributed by the reference value of the quantities eligible for redistribution.

For each shipper, the redistribution amount, implemented by each TSO, is equal to the unitary redistribution amount multiplied by the quantities eligible for redistribution for the period concerned.

Concerning income surpluses generated by the North-South link, in the North to South direction, the volumes consumed pursuant to capacity obtained between 1 October 2014 and 30 September 2018, by a gas-intensive site or by the agent of a gas-intensive site during the phase of allocation of capacity at regulated prices, are not eligible for this redistribution. For each shipper delivering to a gas-intensive site, the volumes excluding redistribution are calculated by multiplying:

- the total volume consumed by this site for the period in question;
- by the capacity quotient obtained during the phase of allocation of capacity at regulated prices by the site concerned or its agent and the average of the total delivery capacity contracted in 2012 and 2013 for the site from the operator to which it is connected (GRTgaz or DNO). In the case where the site is connected to a distribution network, the DNO concerned will send GRTgaz the volumes consumed by the site connected to its network.

If the gas-intensive site is connected downstream of another site directly connected to the network of GRTgaz or a DNO, the volumes excluding redistribution are calculated by multiplying:

- the total volume measured by GRTgaz at the metering point for the site directly connected to the network;
- by the capacity quotient obtained during the phase of allocation of capacity at regulated prices by the shipper for the gas-intensive site downstream of the connected site and the average of the total delivery capacity contracted in 2012 and 2013 for the site directly connected to the network. In the case where the gas-intensive site is downstream of a site connected to a distribution network, the DNO concerned will transmit the volumes consumed by the site connected to its network to GRTgaz.

The capacity obtained during the phase of allocation of capacity at regulated prices is of two types: closed or interruptible. In order to take into account the nature of the capacity, the volume calculations excluded from the scope of redistribution will take into account a capacity equal to:

- 100% of the closed capacity obtained;
- 50% of the interruptible capacity obtained.

2. Calculation of unitary annual redistribution amounts for auction surpluses relating to annual income from 1 October 2015 to 30 September 2016

The unitary redistribution amount pursuant to annual income between 1 October 2015 and 30 September 2016 is equal to a quotient of:

- the surplus income from auctioning annual capacity;
- by the consumption observed in the zone GRTgaz South and TIGF (respectively GRTgaz North) from 1 January to 31 December 2014 reduced, for the North to South link only, by the volumes excluded in relation to capacity obtained during the phase of allocation of capacity at regulated prices for gas-intensive sites located in the zone GRTgaz South and TIGF;

3. Calculation of quarterly unitary redistribution amounts for auction surpluses relating to quarterly income from 1 October 2015 to 30 September 2016

For each quarter, the unitary redistribution amount pursuant to quarterly income between 1 October 2015 and 30 September 2016 is equal to the quotient of:

- the surplus income from auctioning quarterly capacity for the quarter in question;
- by the consumption observed in the zone GRTgaz South and TIGF (respectively GRTgaz North) for the quarter corresponding to the 2014 calendar year reduced, for the North to South link only, by the volumes excluded in relation to capacity obtained during the phase of allocation of capacity at regulated prices for gas-intensive sites located in the zone GRTgaz South and TIGF

4. Calculation of quarterly unitary redistribution amounts for auction surpluses relating to monthly and daily income from 1 October 2014 to 30 June 2015

For each quarter, the unitary redistribution amount pursuant to monthly and daily income between 1 October 2015 and 30 June 2016 is equal to the quotient of:

- the surplus income from auctions of monthly and daily capacity for the corresponding quarter between 1 October 2014 and 30 June 2015;
- by the consumption observed in the zone GRTgaz South and TIGF (respectively GRTgaz North) over the quarter corresponding to the 2014 calendar year reduced, for the North to South link only, by the volumes excluded in relation to capacity obtained during the phase of allocation of capacity at regulated prices for gas-intensive sites located in the zone GRTgaz South and TIGF.

5. Calculation of quarterly unitary redistribution amounts pursuant to redistribution variations observed from 1 October 2014 to 30 June 2015

For each quarter, the quarterly unitary redistribution amount between 1 October 2015 and 30 June 2016 pursuant to redistribution variations is equal to the quotient:

- of the positive or negative variations between:
 - the surplus income from auctions received in relation to annual and quarterly capacity for the corresponding quarter between 1 October 2014 and 30 June 2015;
- and
- the amounts redistributed for the corresponding quarter between 1 October 2014 and 30 June 2015 in relation to annual and quarterly capacity.
- by the consumption that took place in the zone GRTgaz South and TIGF (respectively GRTgaz North) over the quarter corresponding to the 2014 calendar year reduced, for the North to South link only, by the volumes excluded in relation to capacity obtained during the phase of allocation of capacity at regulated prices for gas-intensive sites located in the zone GRTgaz South and TIGF;

6. Publication of unitary redistribution amounts from 1 October 2015 to 30 September 2016

The unitary redistribution amounts from 1 October 2015 to 30 September 2016 will be calculated by each TSO, communicated to the CRE and published by the TSO before 15 July 2015 except in the case of objection by the CRE.

For each quarter, the total unitary redistribution amount is equal to the sum:

- of the unitary annual redistribution amount for auction surpluses relating to annual income from 1 October 2015 to 30 September 2016;
- of the quarterly unitary redistribution amount for auction surpluses relating to quarterly income from 1 October 2015 to 30 September 2016;
- of the quarterly unitary redistribution amount for auction surpluses relating to monthly and daily income from 1 October 2014 to 30 June 2015;
- of the quarterly unitary redistribution amount pursuant to redistribution variations observed from 1 October 2014 to 30 June 2015.

7. Procedures for redistribution of surpluses from auction income

The redistribution will be performed once per quarter at the latest on the transportation invoice for the first month of the following quarter.

For each shipper, the redistribution will be calculated by each TSO by multiplying the total unitary redistribution amount for the quarter in question by the volumes that are allocated to it by the TSO at points of consumption, reduced by volumes excluded pursuant to the phase of allocation of capacity at regulated prices for gas-intensive sites in the case of the North to South link.

In the case of the North to South link, for each shipper delivering to a gas-intensive site that has obtained, directly or through an agent, capacity during the phase of allocation of capacity at regulated prices for gas-intensive sites, the volumes excluded from redistribution are calculated by multiplying:

- the total volume consumed by this site during the quarter in question;
- by the quotient of:
 - the sum of the firm capacity and half of the interruptible capacity obtained during the phase of allocation of capacity at regulated prices for gas-intensive sites for the site in question;
 - by the average delivery capacity contracted for the site during years 2012 and 2013.

V. Transfer of transport capacity on the networks of GRTgaz and TIGF

The transport capacity contracted at points of entry and exit towards the PIR and deliveries between balancing zones may be freely transferred without additional cost.

In case of a complete transfer, the acquirer recovers all rights and obligations related to these contracts.

In case of the transfer of usage rights, the initial owner retains its obligations in relation to TSO. The usage right that is traded may go as low as a daily time-step, whatever the initial contract period.

The usage rights for downstream transport capacity, between the PEG and the point of delivery to an industrial site directly connected to the transport network, is transferable in the case where the industrialist concerned has contracted capacity from TSO.

The procedures for these transfers of transport capacity are defined by the TSO, on an objective and transparent basis that prevents any discrimination, and made public by the TSO on their Internet site.

VI. Penalties for exceeding capacity on the networks of GRTgaz and TIGF

A. Penalties for exceeding contracted daily capacity

1. Procedures for calculating penalties for exceeding daily capacity

Each day, overruns on daily capacity output from the main network, transport on the regional network and delivery, will be subject to penalties.

For the part of the overrun less than or equal to 3% of the contracted daily capacity, no penalty is invoiced.

For the part of the overrun greater than 3%, the penalty calculation is based on the firm daily contract price for daily capacity, as follows:

- for the part of the overrun between 3% and 10%, the penalty is equal to 20 times the firm daily contract price for daily capacity;
- for the part of the overrun greater than 10%, the penalty is equal to 40 times the firm daily contract price for daily capacity.

The TSO make it possible for shippers to quickly adjust their capacity contracts when a capacity overrun is noticed, subject to network availabilities.

2. Procedures for calculating daily capacity overruns

a) Overrunning daily capacity for regional transport and delivery for final consumers connected to the transport network and the PIRR:

For a given day, the daily capacity overrun value used is equal to the difference, if it is positive, between the quantity of gas delivered and the daily delivery capacity contracted.

b) Overrunning daily capacity for regional transport and delivery for the PITD:

For a given day, the daily capacity overrun value used is equal to the difference, if it is positive, between the following two values:

- the value of the difference between the daily quantity of gas delivered and the corresponding daily delivery capacity, if this difference is positive, or zero if this difference is negative;
- the value of the difference between the sum of the daily quantities delivered to "not for contracting" PDL and the sum of standardised capacity for "not for contracting" PDL, if this difference is positive, or zero if this difference is negative.

c) Overrunning daily capacity on output from the main network:

For a given day, the daily capacity overrun value used is equal to the difference, if it is positive, between the following two values:

- the value of the difference between the daily quantity of gas delivered and the daily capacity on output from the corresponding main network, if this difference is positive, or zero if this difference is negative;
- the value of the difference between the sum of the daily quantities delivered at the output zone to "not for contracting" PDL and the sum for the output zone of standardised capacity for the "not for contracting" PDL, if this difference is positive, or zero if this difference is negative.

In case the option to interrupt is exercised by the TSO, the above overrun calculations are carried out by reducing the interruptible capacity for the interrupted part requested by the TSO.

B. Penalties for overrunning hourly capacity

Each day, overruns in hourly transport capacity on the regional and delivery network, to supply final consumers connected to the transport network, are subject to penalties. For a given day, the hourly capacity overrun is calculated by considering the maximum value of the hourly average of quantities delivered to the delivery point concerned over four consecutive hours.

For the part of the overrun less than or equal to 10% of the contracted hourly capacity, no penalty is invoiced.

For the part of the overrun greater than 10%, the penalty calculation is based on the hourly contract price for daily capacity, as follows:

- for the part of the overrun between 10% and 20%, the penalty is equal to 45 times the daily contract price for hourly capacity;
- for the part of the overrun greater than 20%, the penalty is equal to 90 times the daily contract price for hourly capacity.

The penalties for overrunning hourly capacity are not applied by GRTgaz if the shipper corrects its annual hourly capacity contract up to the observed level of overrun.

C. Annual redistribution of penalties for overrunning capacity

Each TSO redistributes the amount of penalties for overrunning capacity collected each year, no later than June of the following year.

For each TSO, the amount of penalties to redistribute is divided between shippers in proportion to the quantities of gas delivered to final consumers connected to the transport network and to PIRR. Each TSO publishes, on its Internet site, the unitary amount of penalties thus redistributed, expressed in euros per MWh consumed by final consumers connected to the transport network.

VII. Notional gas exchange points on the networks of GRTgaz and TIGF

From 1 April 2015, two notional gas exchange points (PEG) will make it possible for shippers to exchange quantities of gas:

- The North PEG, relative to GRTgaz's North balancing zone;
- The Common PEG, relative to the trading region formed by the South balancing zone of GRTgaz and the TIGF zone.

The functioning procedures of the PEGs are defined by the TSOs, based on objective and transparent criteria preventing any discrimination, and made public on their website.

The access tariff to gas exchange points includes:

- a fixed annual charge, equal to €6,000 per exchange point;
- a charge in proportion to quantities exchanged equal to €0.01 per MWh.

When a shipper has signed a transmission contract with GRTgaz, it pays the tariffs for access to the North PEG and the Common PEG to GRTgaz.

When a shipper has exclusively signed a transmission contract with TIGF, it pays the tariff for access to the Common PEG to TIGF.

Exchanges of gas carried out on an electronic platform may be the subject of deliveries at a gas exchange point by an entity in charge of performing compensation between the exchanges taking place on the said electronic platform. The nominations to PEG of a given entity for purposes of compensation, neutral in relation to the market, are not subject to the charge proportional to quantities exchanged.

VIII. Incitative regulation of quality of service of TSOs

In application of the principles defined in the methodological part of the present tariff decision, a mechanism for monitoring service quality is established for the two TSOs in the key areas of their activity. This monitoring is composed of indicators sent each month by the TSOs to the CRE and made public on their websites.

Some indicators that are especially important for correct operation of the market are subject to a system of financial incentives.

The service-quality regulation system may change during the ATRT5 tariff period.

It may be subject to any audit that the CRE may consider relevant.

The TSOs are authorised to neutralise one day per year to calculate indicators, during the commissioning of a major version of an application contributing to the production of the said indicators. They are required to communicate to stakeholders, with a notice period of one month, the tentative date for commissioning, then to confirm one week before the actual date of this commissioning.

A. Service-quality monitoring indicators of the TSOs giving rise to financial incentives

1. Quality of quantities measured at PITD and sent to DNOs the following day to calculate provisional allocations

Calculation:	Number of non-compliant⁽¹⁾ days per balancing zone and per month (one value monitored per balancing zone: namely two values monitored by GRTgaz and one value monitored by TIGF)
Scope:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - all shippers combined - all DNOs combined - per Transmission Balancing Area (ZET)
Monitoring:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - frequency of calculation: monthly - frequency of reporting to the CRE: monthly - frequency of publication: monthly - frequency of financial incentive calculation: monthly
Objective:	<p>GRTgaz:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - base objective: 1 non-compliant day per month - target objective: 0 non-compliant days per month <p>TIGF:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - base objective: 1 non-compliant day per month - target objective: 0 non-compliant days per month
Incentives:	<p>GRTgaz:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - penalties: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • €20 K for the 2nd non-compliant day; • €15 K per non-compliant day, from the 3rd non-compliant day. - bonus: €12.5 K if the target objective is reached. - limit: the total annual amount, corresponding to the amount of penalties to be paid and bonuses to be received by GRTgaz, is limited to plus or minus €200 K per year and per balancing zone. <p>TIGF:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - penalties: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • €15 K for the 2nd non-compliant day; • €10 K per non-compliant day, from the 3rd non-compliant day. - bonus: €12.5 K if the target objective is reached. - limit: the total annual amount, corresponding to the amount of penalties to be paid and bonuses to be received by TIGF, is limited to plus or minus €200 K per year.
Implementation date	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 1 April 2015

(1): For a given balancing zone (ZET), the day D of month M is non-compliant if the variation, by absolute value, between the following values is strictly greater than 2%:

- the provisional measurement of the quantity of gas delivered to all of the PITD in the ZET on this day D and sent to DNO on day D+1 of month M;
- the definitive measurement of the quantity of gas delivered to all of the PITD in the ZET on this day D and sent to DNO on the 20th of the month M+1.

2. Quality of daily quantities remotely metered at points of delivery to consumers connected to the transmission network and sent the following day

Calculation:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Rate of information of very good quality ⁽⁴⁾ - Rate of information of good quality - Rate of information of poor quality <p>(three values monitored for each of the TSOs)</p>
Scope:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - all shippers combined - all ZET combined - all remotely-metered points of industrial delivery - rounded to the nearest percent, one decimal
Monitoring:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - frequency of calculation: monthly - frequency of reporting to the CRE: monthly - frequency of publication: monthly - frequency of financial incentive calculation: monthly
Incentives:	<p>GRTgaz: The financial incentive relates to the monthly average of rates of information of very good and poor quality.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - penalties: €60 K per percent of information of poor quality; - bonus: €1K per percent of information of very good quality. - Limit: the total annual amount, corresponding to the amount of penalties to be paid and bonuses to be received by each TSO, is limited to plus or minus €500 K per year. <p>TIGF: The financial incentive relates to the monthly average of rates of information of very good and poor quality.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - penalties: €30 K per percent of information of poor quality; - bonus: €500 per percent of information of very good quality. - limit: the total annual amount, corresponding to the amount of penalties to be paid and bonuses to be received by TIGF, is limited to plus or minus €250 K per year.
Implementation date	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 1 April 2015

(4): Information is said to be of very good quality if the variation, in absolute value, between the measurement of energy for day D sent on day D+1 and the definitive measurement for day D sent at M+1 is strictly below 1%. If the variation is included between 1% and 3% (respectively strictly greater than 3%), the value is of good quality (respectively of poor quality).

3. Quality of inter-day quantities remotely metered at points of delivery to consumers connected to the transmission network and sent during the day

a) Quality of intra-day quantities remotely metered at points of delivery to consumers connected to TIGF's transport network and sent during the day

Calculation:	Number of compliant⁽³⁾ intra-day readings at industrial delivery points remotely metered during the month / Total number of intra-day readings at industrial delivery points remotely metered during the month (a value monitored by TIGF by timeslot)
Scope:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - all shippers combined - all remotely-metered points of industrial delivery combined - calculation for the following timeslots: 6h-10h, 6h-14h, 6h-18h, 6h-22h and 6h-01h 7d/7 - rounded to the percent
Monitoring:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - frequency of calculation: monthly - frequency of reporting to the CRE: monthly - frequency of publication: monthly - frequency of financial incentive calculation: monthly
Objective:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - base objective 6h-10h: 65% over each month - base objective 6h-14h: 70% over each month - base objective 6h-18h: 75% over each month - base objective 6h-22h: 80% over each month - base objective 6h-01h: 85% over each month - target objective for each timeslot: 90% over each month
Incentives:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - penalty: €1K per percentage point below (strictly) the base objective for each timeslot - bonus: €1K per percentage point above (strictly) the target objective for each timeslot - limit: the total annual amount, corresponding to the amount, over all the timeslots, of penalties to be paid and bonuses to be received by TIGF, is limited to plus or minus €300 K per year.
Implementation date	- 1 April 2014

(3): For a given month *M*, a reading is compliant if there are no more than 5 days in month *M* for which the metering of energy in the timeslot for day *D* sent on day *D* is of poor quality. A reading sent on day *D* is of poor quality if the variation, by absolute value, with the definitive reading for the same timeslot on day *D* sent at *M*+1 is strictly greater than 3% and 100 kWh.

b) Quality of inter-day quantities remotely metered at points of delivery to consumers connected to the GRTgaz network and sent during the day

Calculation:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Rate of information of very good quality ⁽⁴⁾ - Rate of information of good quality - Rate of information of poor quality <p>(three values monitored by GRTgaz per timeslot)</p>
Scope:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - calculation for the following timeslots: 6h-10h, 6h-14h, 6h-18h, 6h-22h and 6h-01h - all shippers combined - all ZET combined - all remotely-metered points of industrial delivery combined - rounded to the percent
Monitoring:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - frequency of calculation: monthly - frequency of reporting to the CRE: monthly - frequency of publication: monthly - frequency of financial incentive calculation: monthly
Incentives:	<p>The financial incentive relates to the average, all timeslots combined, of rates of information of very good and poor quality.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - penalties: €20 K per percent of information of poor quality - bonus: €1K per percent of information of very good quality - Limit: the total annual amount, corresponding to the amount, over all the timeslots, of penalties to be paid and bonuses to be received by GRTgaz, is limited to plus or minus €600 K per year.
Implementation date	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 1 April 2014

(4): Information is said to be of very good quality if the variation, in absolute value, between the measurement of energy in the timeslot for day D sent on day D and the definitive measurement in the timeslot for day D sent at M+1 is strictly below 1%. If the variation is included between 1% and 3% (respectively strictly greater than 3%), the value is of good quality (respectively of poor quality). If the variation is less than 100 kWh, the information is of very good quality.

4. Rates of availability of user portals and public data platforms for the TSOs

Calculation:	<p>Number of hours of availability of the users' portal and the public platform for public data over the month / Total number of hours of opening specified over the month for both interfaces</p> <p>(one value monitored per TSO)</p>
Scope:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - calculated over a usage time of 7:00-23:00, 7d/7 - rounded to one decimal after the decimal point
Monitoring:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - frequency of calculation: monthly - frequency of reporting to the CRE: monthly - frequency of publication: monthly - frequency of financial incentive calculation: monthly
Objective:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - base objective: 99% per month - target objective: 100% per month
Incentives:	<p>GRTgaz:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - penalty: €1.5 K per tenth of a percent below the base objective <p>TIGF:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - penalty: €1 K per tenth of a percent below the base objective
Implementation date:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 1 April 2015

5. Quality of overall consumption forecasts at the end of the gas day made the day before and during the day

Calculation:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Rate of information of very good quality ⁽⁵⁾ - Rate of information of good quality - Rate of information of poor quality <p>(a rate per balancing zone for the values published the day before and during the day, representing four values monitored by GRTgaz and two values monitored by TIGF)</p>
Scope:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - all shippers combined - one value per ZET - rounded to one decimal after the decimal point
Monitoring:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - frequency of calculation: monthly - frequency of reporting to the CRE: monthly - frequency of publication: monthly - frequency of financial incentive calculation: monthly
Incentives:	<p>The financial incentive relates to the average of rates of information of very good and poor quality.</p> <p>GRTgaz: For the values published the day before (D-1) and during the day (D):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - penalties: €40 per tenth of a percent of information of poor quality - bonus: €10 per tenth of a percent of information of very good quality - Limit: the total monthly amount, corresponding to the amount, over all the timeslots, of penalties to be paid and bonuses to be received by GRTgaz, is limited to plus or minus €20 K per balancing zone and per indicator. <p>TIGF: For the values published the day before (D-1) and during the day (D):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - penalties: €40 per tenth of a percent of information of poor quality - bonus: €10 per tenth of a percent of information of very good quality - Limit: the total monthly amount, corresponding to the amount, over all the timeslots, of penalties to be paid and bonuses to be received by TIGF, is limited to plus or minus €10 K per balancing zone and per indicator.
Implementation date:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 1 April 2014

(5): concerning the forecast made the day before, information is said to be of very good, respectively good and poor quality if the variation, in absolute value, between the following values is strictly less than 4%, respectively between 4% and 7% and strictly greater than 7%:

- the consumption forecast for day D published the day before at 17:00;
- the definitive measurement of energy consumed on day D sent on the 20th of M+1.

Concerning the forecast made during the day, information is said to be of very good, respectively good and poor quality if the variation, in absolute value, between the following values is strictly less than 3%, respectively between 3% and 5% and strictly greater than 5%:

- the consumption forecast for day D published on day D at 15:00;
- the definitive reading of energy consumed on day D.

The overall forecasts for consumption at the end of the gas day used to calculate the indicator concerning industrial customers, excluding sites subject to large adjustments, and public distributions connected to the TSO's network.

B. Other indicators for monitoring the service quality of the TSOs

6. Incentive to make additional firm capacity available to the market on the North-South link

Calculation:	Annual combined additional closed daily capacity marketed by GRTgaz to the North-South link, in the North to South direction
Scope:	- Combined interruptible and firm daily capacity marketed beyond 270 GWh/day
Monitoring:	- frequency of calculation: monthly - frequency of reporting to the CRE: monthly - frequency of publication: monthly - frequency of calculation of financial incentives: annual
Incentives:	- Initially, this indicator will not be subject to any financial incentive.
Implementation date:	- 1 January 2015

7. Monitoring the interventions of the TSOs in the markets for balancing

The indicator measures the variation between the intervention price of the TSO and the average price observed on a PEG for a given calendar day:

- if the intervention of the TSO remains close to the average market price observed for a given day on the corresponding PEG, it generates a bonus;
- if the intervention of the TSO significantly varies from the average market price observed for a given day on the corresponding PEG, it incurs a penalty.

Calculation:	Variation by percentage and by €/MWh between the maximum purchase price and minimum sale price of the TSO and the average weighted price of volumes traded <i>within-day</i> during the calendar day, on Pownext.
Scope:	- A value per balancing zone (North and South) from GRTgaz and from TIGF
Monitoring:	- frequency of calculation: monthly - frequency of reporting to the CRE: monthly - frequency of publication: monthly - frequency of financial incentive calculation: monthly
Incentives:	- Initially, this indicator will not be subject to any financial incentive, the objective being to observe the intervention conditions of the TSOs in the target balancing system.
Implementation date:	- 1 April 2015

8. Return to the linepack gas level of the previous day

In order to prompt the TSOs to have a constant level of line pack from one day to the next, and to counterbalance the incentive created by the indicator monitoring the interventions of the TSOs in the markets for balancing, the CRE proposes creating an indicator for monitoring return to line pack level of the previous day.

Calculation:	Variation between the line pack on D+1 and the line pack of day D, at 06:00, in MWh
Scope:	- One value per balancing zone: North, South and TIGF
Monitoring:	- calculation frequency: daily - frequency of reporting to the CRE: monthly - frequency of publication: monthly
Incentives:	- Initially, this indicator will not be subject to any financial incentive, the objective being to observe the intervention conditions of the TSOs in the target balancing system.
Implementation date:	- 1 April 2015

9. Monitoring information published on public sites of the TSOs and used for balancing

- a) Monitoring the provision of the five items of information most useful for balancing on the public sites of the TSOs

The CRE accepts the proposal from operators to create a new indicator for monitoring regular updates to the five most important items of information published on the public sites of TSOs, SMART (GRTgaz) and Data Gas (TIGF). These five items of information should be defined as part of the Consultation, before 1 April 2015. This indicator will not be subject to any financial incentive initially.

- b) Monitoring deadlines for publication of notices of fulfilment and balancing

The deadlines for publishing contractual notices of fulfilment and balancing will be monitored as part of the balancing *Concertation*.

10. Indicators related to maintenance programmes

Indicator name	Calculation of the indicator	Frequency of reporting to the CRE and publication	Implementation date
Reduction of available capacity	Closed capacity made available during work / technical closed capacity (a value per type of network point ⁽⁶⁾ for each TSO)	Monthly Indicators calculated for the months of January to December	1 April 2009
Compliance with the annual maintenance programme published at the beginning of the year by the TSO	Percentage variation of the capacity made available between the projected maintenance programme published at the beginning of the year and the maintenance programme completed (a value per type of network point ⁽⁶⁾ for each TSO)		1 April 2009
Compliance with the maintenance programme published in M-2 by the TSO	Percentage variation of the capacity made available between the projected maintenance programme published at M-2 and the maintenance programme completed (a value per type of network point ⁽⁶⁾ for each TSO)		GRTgaz: mid-2009 TIGF: 1 April 2009
Compliance with the maintenance programme relating to interruptible capacity on the North-South link published in M-2 by GRTgaz	Example: Percentage variation between the projected maintenance programme concerning interruptible capacity published in M-2 and the maintenance programme completed on the North-South link <i>Procedures to be defined in the Gas Consultation</i>		<i>Implementation date: 1 April 2015</i>

(6): five types of points are accepted:

- the North / South link in both directions;
- the PIR in the dominant direction;
- the input to PITTM;
- the input and output to PITS;
- the "GRTgaz South / TIGF" interface in both directions.

11. Indicators related to the relationship with shippers

Indicator name	Calculation of the indicator	Frequency of reporting to the CRE and publication	Objective / Implementation date
Monitoring deadlines for implementing connections	Ratio of number of days of delay for filling connection structures with gas in relation to the deadline in the contract with the customer (Each TSO monitors a value for the DNOs, one for industrial consumers and one for producers of bio-LNG)	quarterly	Objective: 0% Implementation date: 1 April 2013
Reliability of information on customer interfaces	Number of complaints concerning the reliability of information (one value monitored per TSO)	Monthly	Objective: 0 claim Implementation date: 1 April 2013
Delay for processing requests for capacity reservation on the main network	Average delay for processing reservation requests (one value monitored per TSO)	Monthly	Objective: 2 working days per month Change implementation date: 1 April 2010

12. Indicators related to the environment

Indicator name	Calculation of the indicator	Frequency of reporting to the CRE and publication	Implementation date
Greenhouse gas emissions	Monthly greenhouse gas emissions (in equivalent CO₂) (one value monitored per TSO)	Quarterly	1 January 2009
Emissions of greenhouse gas related to the volume of gas transported	Monthly emissions of greenhouse gases / Monthly volume of gas transported (one value monitored per TSO)		1 January 2009

13. indicator related to data transmission

Indicator name	Calculation of the indicator	Frequency of reporting to the CRE and publication	Objective / Implementation date
Delay for transmitting to DNOs of files relative to gas takes from PITD	Number of days per month for which the TSO has sent, to DNO, the file relative to projected daily gas takes from PITD beyond the deadline agreed between the TSOs and the DNOs (a value monitored by TSO, all shippers, all ZET and all DNOs combined)	Monthly	<i>Objective:</i> one file sent beyond the deadline per month <i>Implementation date:</i> 1 January 2009

IX. Appendices

Annex 1: List of GRTgaz's gas transmission network delivery points classified by main network exit zone.

Annex 2: List of TIGF's gas transmission network delivery points classified by main network exit zone.

The present decision will be published to the *Journal officiel de la République française*.

Signed in Paris, 19 March, 2015

For the French Energy Regulatory Commission,
The President,

Philippe de Ladoucette